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Abstract
Throughout modern history many diﬀerent approaches to financial regulation
have been tried. However, as the recent financial crisis of 2007 demonstrated, the
existing rules and regulations were not enough to prevent a financial crash. The crisis
spurred new thinking and one outcome was the idea of a broader use of time-varying
macroprudential policy. The experience of many of these new policies is limited.
However, since many of the proposed policy measures aﬀects the credit market, it
is not unlikely that some of the measures may slow down economic growth. Of the
same reason, the question of whether these new policy measures have an eﬀect on
the eﬃciency of monetary policy has been posed.
This thesis is an extensive review of much of the literature concerning macropruden-
tial policy with a special consideration to the literature concerning its interaction
with monetary policy. Using a discussion between Lars Svensson and Michael Wood-
ford as a backdrop, two diﬀerent proposals onto how to best address systemic risk
is discussed. Their discussion serves as a basis for an analysis of many of the issues
addressed in the literature.
Until more empirical results about the eﬀects of macroprudential policy is presented,
it is diﬃcult to make clear suggestions about how best to coordinate macroprudential
and monetary policy. The term "macroprudential" must be concretized and more
empirical results on the extent to which macroprudential instruments aﬀects the
eﬃciency of monetary policy is needed. If these results were to indicate that macro-
prudential policy does interact with monetary policy, some form of coordination of
policy may be appropriate.
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1 Introduction
"Macroprudential policy is roughly where monetary policy was in the ’40s. If I were being
charitable, that would be the 1940s, rather than the 1840s."1
The size and complexity of the global financial market have increased steadily over the
last century. It is today hard to find areas of human activity (other than the most basic
existence in the few remaining truly undeveloped areas of the world) which are not in
some way connected to the global market for financial services. This development has
accelerated over the last decades, as the globalization of the world economy has steadily
opened new markets to foreign investments, trade and banking. A logical consequence
of this is that the world economy has become more dependent on the infrastructure of
financial markets. In turn, large disruptions in international finance reach further and
aﬀects more people than ever before.
The financial system comprises of countless assets and markets. The set of regulations,
rules and laws meant to guard the public against adverse disruptions is just as diverse.
Throughout modern history many diﬀerent approaches to financial regulation have been
tried. Some was implemented to reduce the probability or cost of the occasional breach
of trust in banks. Most of them still applies (e.g. deposit insurance2). Other regulations
have been discarded as they turned out to create to much frictions in the financial system
and hence also impeded economic growth. For instance, national banks in the US were
not allowed to extend mortgages until 1913 and then only under strict conditions3. Simi-
larly, up until the middle of the 1980’s, the credit market was controlled by the Norwegian
government by way of the setting of interest rates.4 However, as the recent financial crisis
of 2007 demonstrated, the existing rules and regulations were not enough to prevent a
financial crash. The enormous costs of a financial crisis has spurred new ideas. Some have
advocated a new thinking in monetary policy. Others are contesting this and favors more
targeted rules to reduce instability across the financial system.
1Andy Haldane, chief economist in the Bank of England (The Telegraph, 21 June, 2014)
2Introduced at the federal level in the US in the 1930s (Calomiris (1990) and Diamond & Dybvig
(1983)).
3The National Banking Act of 1913 allowed national banks to extend farm mortgages, but only with
a Loan-to-Value ratio of maximum 50 percent and for terms no longer than five years. (Elliott, Feldberg
& Lehnert 2013).
4Meinich, Per. (2014, 30. mai). Penge og Kredittpolitikk. Store norske leksikon.
https://snl.no/penge-_og_kredittpolitikk
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Macroprudential policy is meant to mitigate and control systemic risk. There is, however,
to this day no widespread consensus on either the kind of macroprudential measures are
most eﬃcient at reducing systemic risk or how such measures may aﬀect other parts of
the economy.
One way to categorize the diﬀerent policy tools is presented in Elliott et al. (2013). There
it is noted that systemic risk and hence macroprudential policy, can be divided into two
categories. Structural risks are threats to the economy that are always present. Exam-
ples are the "too big to fail"-problem which may induce moral hazard and the implicit
promise within money market mutual funds to repay investors at par on demand, which
may make them prone to runs if uncertainty arise. Cyclical risks are threats that include
asset price bubbles and rapid credit and leverage growth leaving the economy vulnerable
to shocks. This type of risk and the countercyclical macroprudential policies which are
measures that can be adapted to changing financial conditions, will be the main focus of
this thesis.
The fact that the countercyclical macroprudential instruments are intended to be ad-
justed depending on the state of the economy makes the interaction with monetary policy
an important factor when designing the policy framework for macroprudential policy.
Some authors believe that the best approach is to coordinate monetary and macropru-
dential policy to optimize policy responses. Others, though acknowledging the potential
gains of coordination, comments that political economy challenges may arise from such
an organization. Some partially ascribes the recent financial crisis to a failure of the
established doctrine of inflation targeting in monetary policy and suggests a re-thinking
of this to also include financial risk as a determining element when deciding upon mone-
tary policy. This divergence in conclusions may reflect the still limited empirical evidence
on the eﬃciency of macroprudential policy. This thesis provides a review of this discussion.
This thesis is structured in three parts. First, a brief definition of macroprudential policy
will be oﬀered with a presentation of the prevailing thoughts in the literature addressing
the economic frictions macroprudential policy is meant to mitigate. As several authors
have pointed out, policymakers are in need of good metrics and measurement tools to get
a reliable estimate of what the state of the financial system is to be able to make pru-
dent policy actions. A number of suggested metrics and indicators for systemic risk will
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therefore be assessed. Based on what is most discussed in the literature or already have
been implemented and therefore also encapsulates more empirical research and results,
six diﬀerent macroprudential instruments will thereafter be discussed and compared with
each other.
The second part of the thesis will discuss the interaction between monetary and macro-
prudential policy. This encapsulates both how their eﬀects on the economy interact and
a review of how the organization of the mandates of securing the traditional monetary
policy goals and the goal of sustaining financial stability may aﬀect policy decisions.
Thirdly, using a discussion between Lars Svensson and Michael Woodford in the Sveriges
Riksbank Economic Review as a backdrop, two diﬀerent proposals onto how best to ad-
dress systemic risk will be discussed.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Macroprudential Policy
Lim, Columba, Costa, Kongsamut, Otani, Saiyid & Wu (2011) refer to IMF5 when they
characterize macroprudential policy based on three defining elements:
• Its objective: to minimize the impact on the real economy of widespread disrup-
tions in the provisioning of financial services.
• Its analytical scope: the focus on the financial system as whole, including inter-
actions between the real and the financial sector. As opposed to individual entities.
• Its instruments: it primarily uses prudential tools that have been designed and
calibrated to target systemic risk, rather than risks in individual institutions.
In line with Lim et al. (2011), Elliott et al. (2013) refer to macroprudential regulation as
an approach that can fill the gap between traditional macroeconomic regulation, such as
financial and monetary policy, and the microprudential regulation, the purpose of which
is to regulate individual financial institutions. In Galati & Moessner (2013) the diﬀeren-
tiation between macro- and microprudential policy is done by examining their ultimate
5IMF, Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing Framework (2011)
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objectives. That is, macroprudential policy is defined as policy designed to avoid macroe-
conomic costs stemming from financial instability. Microprudential policy, on the other
hand, has as its objective consumer protection, both investors and depositors.6 Jeanne
& Korinek (2014) are in line, arguing that microprudential regulation aims to guarantee
the stability of individual banks, and hence by definition is a form of bank regulation,
with the goal of limiting moral hazard stemming from financial safety nets provided by
the government, such as deposit insurance. These objectives often coincide with macro-
prudential goals, and that explains why many macroprudential tools are microprudential
in nature. Though, as Elliott (2011) points out, risks that are common to many financial
institutions, combined with a high degree of interconnections between these institutions
can create systemic risk. That is, risk can evolve even though the individual institutions
themselves are appearing safe and sound.
An example on this matter is the housing credit bubble that were building up prior
to the financial crisis of 2008. Bullard, Neely & Wheelock (2009) explains that the rapid
growth in housing prices and credit levels in the US persisted for so long because of low
interest rates, rapid income growth and innovations in the mortgage market. These in-
novations made banks lower their underwriting standards7. By collateralizing mortgages
and selling them oﬀ as bonds, financial intermediators could lend out funds without facing
the risk attached to these loans. These initial lenders did not have strong incentives to
make sure of the borrowers creditworthiness, before extending loans. Additionally, the
collateralizing of the debt may have masked the true risk whereafter the bonds sold got
a higher credit standard by rating agencies than what they perhaps should have had.
The subprime loans8 and the bonds and securities attached to them gave for long a high
return in the US. A high growth in housing prices combined with low interest rates made
the delinquency ratio on subprime loans low over a long period from the late 1990s. One
reason was that these borrowers were able to refinance9 or sell their house at a higher
price than they bought it for, if they were unable to make their loan payments. If a
widespread fall in housing prices were to occur, the subprime borrowers who were unable
6(Galati & Moessner 2013) Table 1.
7See Terms for explanation.
8subprime loans is a term used on mortgage loans to borrowers with a bad credit score. That may
imply a history of delinquency, bankruptcy or a high loan-to-value ratio (Bullard et al. 2009).
9Via "cash-out" refinance borrowers could withdraw accumulated equity from their homes, due the
continuos increase in housing prices in the years before the crisis. In that way, borrowers were able to
pay their loan payments if their income was not suﬃcient (Bullard et al. 2009).
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to make their loan payments would no longer be able to sell or refinance their homes and
thus be unable to make their payments (Bullard et al. 2009). The risk of such an event
may have been underestimated. Bullard et al. (2009) comments that critics have charged
rating agencies for having a conflict of interest when rating bonds and securities. As it
was the bond issuers who paid for the ratings, rating agencies may have been inclined to
give the debt products a better rating than they should have had. Further, Bullard et al.
note that some investors may have relied too heavily on those ratings, when making their
investment decisions. The expansion in credit, and buying and selling of the collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs) caused high degrees of leverage in financial institutions and a
common exposure to the housing market by these institutions. Both high leverage ratios
and the common exposure are examples of factors that increase systemic risk. I will get
back to both these features later in the thesis.
The acknowledgment that there are risks in the financial sector that under some cir-
cumstances are not internalized by investors and financial institutions has made the case
for macroprudential policy. Before we go deeper in assessing possible policy measures, we
need to further clarify the terms financial instability and systemic risk, as the existence
of these features are what justifies policy interventions in the form of macroprudential
policy.
2.2 Financial Stability and Systemic Risk
Theoretical research on financial frictions and systemic risk is developing fast after the
recent financial crisis. In this section I refer to some of the mechanisms most discussed in
the current literature. Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999) introduced the financial ac-
celerator, and by that a theoretical foundation for analyzing how frictions in the financial
sector could aﬀect the business cycle, primarily through amplification and propagation.
Though, as Elliott et al. (2013) point out, their model does not include an independent
role for the financial system as a source of shocks. Further Elliott et al. (2013) comment
that the standard economic models used by central banks prior to the financial crisis of
2007-2009 suggested that finance was not an independent source of risk, but rather a
"veil". Borchgrevink, Ellingsrud & Hansen (2014) are in line with Elliott et al. and argue
that much of the literature explaining how financial frictions can amplify the real sector
does not model shocks originating in the financial sector. Further, they note that there
is no clear scope for macroprudential policy in the framework, as the literature does not
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explain how a regulator should intervene to limit the impact financial instability may have
through amplifying shocks in the real sector.
One aim of Borchgrevink et al. (2014) is to present an overview of the market failures
in the financial system that causes the imbalances that in turn can be addressed and
eliminated by macroprudential regulation. They observe that any regulatory intervention
should be justified by market failures. So before one can assess potential instruments
to target financial instability, one needs to identify the market failures that creates the
systemic risk. Borchgrevink et al. (2014) have identified a number of categories of market
frictions that can cause systemic risk, and hence give rise to the use of macroprudential
regulation.
Asymmetric information (between lender and borrower) and limited enforcement by
banks to collect outstanding debt, cause the need for collateral to get access to credit. As
assets are used as collateral when taking on debt, asset price swings may have a direct
eﬀect on the amount of debt agents in the economy can get. In good times increases
in asset values, and hence collateral, expands the credit constraint for borrowers. That
implies that borrowers can take on more debt. The behavior of the credit institutions
further accelerates the cycle. More specifically, Claessens, Ghosh & Mihet (2014) refers
to recent research10 who observes that banks’ perception of risk is inherently procyclical.
The reason is twofold. First, banks may prefer to keep their risk-weighted assets as a
constant ratio to capital. Second, during a boom the banks’ assessment of their "value
at risk"11 tends to decline. To keep the mentioned ratio constant when their weighted
risk declines, banks are likely to expand the size of their assets rather than decrease their
equity capital. The consequence is more lending and lending which carries higher risk
(Claessens et al. 2014). This practice by credit institutions feeds into the asset price cy-
cle, increasing collateral values and further decrease the value at risk.
When this pecuniary externality with a potential to cause "overborrowing" is not inter-
nalized, too much debt may be accumulated compared to the social optimum. Following
a negative shock, this may have consequences on the real economy via debt deflation12,
which depresses aggregate demand. Another consequence is that sound investments may
10Adrian and Shin (2010) and (2014)
11Further explained in Terms
12see "Concepts" for definitions of fire sales and debt deflation
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not get funding, due to the deteriorated values of collateral and an increase in the price
of risk.
Another pecuniary externality in the financial sector may be associated with the widespread
use of wholesale short-term debt by banks to finance their loans (Adrian, Covitz & Liang
(2013) and Borchgrevink et al. (2014)). This may be a source of excessive maturity mis-
matches, as the banks debt constantly needs to be rolled over or paid back while the
banks’ assets are long-term, e.g mortagages. Short-term debt may be a cheap form of
financing, and in a boom where the price of risk declines the interest spread between the
short-term debt and the long assets is tempting for banks. As noted by Borchgrevink
et al. (2014) however, banks may fail to internalize all of the cost when they are reliant
on short term debt. In a crisis, banks may find it diﬃcult to roll over their short term
debt due to an increase in the demanded return by investors on that debt. To pay back
the short term debt they might have to sell oﬀ assets, but as explained by Borchgrevink
et al. the price of similar assets held by other banks may decline when one bank starts to
sell these assets, and the value of their collateral and access to funding may be aﬀected.
This is the pecuniary externality. The failure of banks to internalize how these fire-sales in
other institutions can aﬀect their own assets may leave the financial system with excessive
amounts of wholesale short-term debt, which creates systemic risk.
If banks have completely diﬀerent portfolios, so investors do not question other banks’
ability to oblige their short term debt when one institution is in distress, if banks are
not connected to each other through lending, and investors and depositors are completely
rational, the above mentioned externality might not pose a serious threat to the financial
sector. That, however, seems unrealistic. This brings us on to another externality in the
financial sector discussed in Borchgrevink et al. (2014). Namely interconnectedness
externalities.
At the micro level, a banks’ portfolio may look safe and sound in terms of risk. This
might seem to mean that if the bank, in isolation is hit by a shock, the depositors and
investors need not worry. Though at the macro level one needs to compare the banks’
portfolio with the other institutions in the financial system to evaluate the aggregate risk.
Cecchetti & Kohler (2014) states that a central externality within the financial system is
joint failures of institutions, resulting from a similar exposure towards the real economy
and interlinkages among institutions at a single point in time.
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Borchgrevink et al. (2014) explains the two threats mentioned in Cecchetti and Kohler
further, and adds a third element of interconnectedness externalities. The first is the risk
arising from correlated portfolios. If a shock to the value of assets banks possess occur,
and they all have the same exposure to those assets, all of them will be hit directly. The
recent crisis, where many financial institutions in the US were exposed to the subprime
mortgage market stands out as a good example. Individually, the banks thought they
were diversified, but since they all were exposed to the same risk, collectively they were
not. Second, systemic risk can arise from balance sheet interlinkages between banks. If a
bank meets distress in isolation, it may still impose a threat to other entities if it is closely
tied to other banks via debt. If one bank go bankrupt, it can drag other institutions down
with it. This is what we may call direct contagion (Allen & Gale (2000) and Gai et al.
(2011)). Indirect contagion is a mechanism closely tied to the pecuniary externality dis-
cussed earlier. A banks distress may impose a threat on other banks as asset prices fall
when the troubled bank sells its assets in a fire sale to finance its obligations. A third
externality stemming from interconnection is expectational spill-overs. The uncertainty
arising within the financial system when some banks are in distress might arise questions
regarding other, sound banks and their solidness. As a result, these financially sound
banks may find it more diﬃcult to get funding (see e.g. Caballero and Simsek (2009)).
Eventually, expectations alone could lead to bank runs on sound banks as well as the
banks who actually are in distress.13
Another market phenomenon is strategic complementarities. That is the tendency of
agents to want to "do more when others do more". An often used example is bank runs,
where depositors withdraw their deposits based on expectations that others will do the
same. In Diamond & Dybvig (1983) bank runs are caused by a shift in expectations. The
shift in expectations can can be caused by almost anything.14As depositors run to with-
draw their deposits, banks must liquidate their assets. A widespread asset sale by banks
cause the price of those assets to drop. As a result, even "healthy" banks might default.
This may have real economic eﬀects as banks recall loans and productive investments are
terminated. Similar behavior have been observed by banks in the form of liquidity hoard-
13There were no bank-runs in Norway during the financial crisis in 2008-09. However, banks did
experience a widening gap in the diﬀerence between the key policy rate and the Norwegian InterBank
Oﬀered Rate (NIBOR) during the crisis. One reason for that development may have been a growing
uncertainty in the financial system as a whole.
14"... a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a negative government
forecast, or even sunspots." (page. 410 (Diamond & Dybvig 1983).
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ing. This is the tendency of banks to hoard liquidity based on the expectation that it will
be more diﬃcult to get funding in the capital markets down the road. Inevitably, funding
do get more diﬃcult because the hoarding by some reduces the liquidity in the market and
thus increases the incentive for other entities to hoard liquidity (Gale & Yorulmazer 2013).
The prospect of bailouts by the government, in the wake of a crisis, may induce banks
to correlate their exposure. If a shock then occurs to the assets held by nearly all of the
institutions in the financial sector, the likelihood of a bailout is far greater than if only an
individual bank is hit by a shock. Policymakers will be more reluctant to intervene when
only a minority of banks are hit by the shock (Borchgrevink et al. 2014). The same mech-
anism may be at work if bank managers are concerned with their short-term reputation
(Rajan (1994)). The motivation is that capital markets will be more forgiving towards in-
dividual institutions if the whole financial sector is hit by an adverse shock. The incentive
is therefore to correlate risk with other institutions and engage in excessive risk taking.
If a shock does not occur, profits will be high. If the opposite happens, the shock will
hit the whole sector, so the market will evaluate the individual banks more leniently. As
explained earlier, correlated portfolios make the whole system more vulnerable to shocks.
2.3 Measuring Systemic Risk
Hannoun (2010) refers to the "paradox of financial instability". That is that the financial
system looks the strongest precisely when it is at its most fragile. Relying on this paradox
to decide when to increase capital standards would be foolish. We need better, and more
accurate indicators of financial stability as a basis for developing macroprudential policy.
Such policies might also need to be adjustable to be eﬃcient. Considerable research on
how to detect these fragilities have been done since the 2008 crisis. Here is a summary of
some of the most prevalent views and results arising from this.
Adrian et al. (2013) defines Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
as institutions whose distress could disrupt the functioning of the financial system. Being
able to measure the degree of stability in these institutions is therefore crucial in order to
decide when to implement macroprudential tools. Adrian et al. (2013) divides the indi-
cators into Standard and Market indicators. Standard indicators include regulatory
capital and leverage ratios, asset liquidity, wholesale short-term funding ratios and con-
fidential supervisory assessments. They do pose the concern that these indicators often
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are viewed as lagging in time, so that policy actions based on these indicators often are
sub-optimally timed. When it comes to market indicators Adrian et al. (2013) mentions
CDS (Credit Default Swaps) premiums, equity prices and expected default probabilities,
but stress that these measures only indirectly measure systemic risk, as it is diﬃcult to
distinguish the overall pricing of risk and the riskiness of one institution. This is also a
criticism taken up in Galati & Moessner (2013). They comment that these measures are
backward looking, or at most contemporaneous as indicators of financial distress. They
are also in line with Adrian et al. (2013) with regard to the second point, namely that the
market indicators only to a certain degree measure systemic risk. However, Galati and
Moessner are a bit more dismissive as they argue that the balance sheet indicators15 and
market indicators are micro in nature and thereby fail to highlight vulnerabilities at the
aggregate level.
Adrian et al. (2013) also focuses on supervisory stress test16, which are meant to
project wether the largest SIFIs have suﬃcient capital to withstand a shock. The re-
sults from the stress tests have largely been viewed as informative on the resilience of
individual firms to shocks, but these tests do, to some extent, also incorporate spill-over
eﬀects within the financial system. Adrian et al. (2013) comment that the stress tests do
reveal some information regarding how firms would fare in a systemic event, when firms
simultaneously are experiencing stress. As Adrian et al. (2013), and Galati & Moessner
(2013) also argue, stress tests is a good instrument to highlight potential transmissions
of shocks within the financial system. In line with Adrian et al. (2013), they point out,
however, that such tests in practice fail to capture feedback eﬀects between the financial
system and the real economy. By that, the tests also fail to capture how small shocks can
have substantial eﬀects. However, the main advantage of stress tests, as opposed to other
approaches, is that they are by nature forward looking. This is a factor emphasized espe-
cially in Galati & Moessner (2013). By forward looking we mean they have the potential
of signaling systemic risk and highlight potential channels or areas of the economy that
are particularly vulnerable, before an actual bust occur. This gives the market as well
as policymakers the possibility to take actions to strengthen the system and potentially
prevent a bust.
Vector autoregression models (VARs) are subjected to much of the same criticism
15Galati & Moessners term for Standard indicators
16See Terms for a more thorough explanation of stress tests.
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as stress tests. According to Galati & Moessner (2013) VARs are a flexible tool for detect-
ing the potential for financial distress, but as with stress tests they oﬀer only a stylized
description of the dynamics of the financial sector. Hence, they tend to fail to capture
the full feedback to the macroeconomy that financial distress could impose.
Another line of research, commented on by both Adrian et al. (2013) and Galati & Moess-
ner (2013), is the concept of CoVaR, or Conditional Value at Risk. This is meant
to be an indicator for systemic risk, measuring the value at risk (VaR) of the financial
system conditional on institutions being in distress. Adrian et al. (2013) comments that
this measure is a direct attempt to uncover the systemic risk. They do point out the
problem that this measure, as with all market-based measures, "are not immune to con-
founding eﬀects of overall risk pricing"17. Galati & Moessner (2013) notes that though
the CoVaR measure is appealing, due to its ability to capture spillover-eﬀects across the
financial system, there are several criticisms of the measure. First and foremost, the Co-
VaR is a measure on individual institutions and their individual contribution to systemic
risk. However, the estimated CoVaR of institutions can not be added up so to get an
aggregate measure of systemic risk for the whole financial system. Another issue is that
the estimated correlations between institutions, which are measured in normal times, are
likely to behave very diﬀerently in a crisis.18
A severe drop in valuations of assets may constitute a financial stability concern if
the valuations have been supported by excessive leverage, maturity transformation, or lax
underwriting standards, as defaults then may become extensive and trigger a crisis.
Adrian et al. (2013) stresses the importance of assessing asset valuations relative to fun-
damentals, and not relative to other asset prices. They claim that relative asset prices
are not informative for financial stability purposes. "If asset values are particularly rich
relative to fundamentals by historical standards, asset prices are in danger of reverting
abruptly, triggering the potential for financial instability".19 It is stressed in Adrian et al.
(2013) that mispriced assets, relative to fundamentals, must be considered in conjunction
with investor leverage, maturity mismatch, degree of liquidity of the securities and under-
writing standards before making any solid arguments regarding systemic risk. Galati &
Moessner (2013) also focuses on asset market indicators. They claim that these, together
17page 14
18See Terms for a more detailed explanation on the CoVaR measure.
19page 22
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with credit aggregates perform relatively well in predicting financial distress, even over
longer horizons (1-4 years).
A financial crisis may have big eﬀects on real variables in the economy. In their study,
using data from 14 countries from 1870 to 2008, Schularick & Taylor (2012) finds an esti-
mated cumulative impact on real output after five years following a financial crisis to be a
drop of 7.9 percentage points, relative to trend (post-World War II). They also conclude
that the single best predictor for financial crisis is past credit growth. This result is
in line with several other studies.20 Both Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978, 2000)
argued that a period of high credit growth and rising asset prices could lead to financial
instability (Riiser 2012). The prevailing optimism during a boom deteriorates banks risk
assessment and cause banks to issue loans that they probably would not have issued in
other phases of the cycle. By ignoring the potentially high default rates by borrowers
that could occur in a downturn, banks’ behavior are creating systemic risk (Anh 2011).
So, following this logic, credit growth should be a good indicator for measuring financial
instability. The Basel Committee has also acknowledged this, and has recommended that
the countercyclical capital buﬀer should be linked to the gap between the credit-to-GDP
ratio and its long term trend (Riiser 2012).
2.3.1 The Credit-to-GDP Gap
The credit-to-GDP ratio consists of total private debt, as a fraction of total GDP. Riiser
(2010) explaines that in the Norwegian Central Bank the measure of credit in the indi-
cator for credit-to-GDP includes total credit to municipalities, non-financial enterprises
and households. The ratios long term trend is calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter
to isolate the trend in the credit-to-GDP growth.
In their publication on how to manage and implement the countercyclical capital buﬀer
the Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank) lists four key indicators to measure financial
instability (Norges Bank No.1 2013). The indicators are;
• The ratio of total credit21 to mainland GDP
• The ratio of house prices to household disposable income
• Commercial property prices
20Anundsen, Gerdrup, Hansen & Kragh-Sørensen (2014) and Anh (2011).
21By total credit they refer to households and mainland enterprises.
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• The wholesale funding ratio of Norwegian credit institutions
In the paper, Norges Bank argue that when financial crisis do occur they usually follow
a period of strong increases in credit and property prices. Since real estate is both col-
lateral and an asset, increases in credit and real estate prices are mutually reinforcing.
They further argue that in periods where credit growth exceeds deposit growth, wholesale
funding increase. They claim that a high and rising ratio of wholesale funding reinforce
the increase in credit and prices. A high wholesale funding ratio may carry risk in tur-
bulent times, as the financial institutions to a larger extent will be exposed to the risk
of maturity mismatches and fire-sales. This, in turn, could lead to a sharp tightening in
banks’ lending (Norges Bank No.1 2013).
Drehmann & Tsatsaronis (2014) states that the credit-to-GDP gap is meant to inform,
not to dictate policymakers’ decisions regarding the capital buﬀer. They do however ac-
knowledge the criticism expressed by some authors with regard to the lack of a theoretical
foundation for the indicator to be able to correctly identify periods of "excessive" credit
growth. For example, developing countries may experience periods of excessive credit
growth, far above a trend estimate, that can be justified as a natural part of the devel-
oping process. Similarly, as explained in Schularick & Taylor (2012), eras of financial
innovation, development and liberalization would see an expansion in credit to support
real economic gains. This kind of expansion does not necessarily constitute a threat to
financial stability. Referring to a study by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS),
where it is argued that peaks in the financial cycle22 are associated with banking crisis,
Leeper & Nason (2014) point out that sharply distinguishing a financial cycle from the
business cycle is not an easy task. It may well be diﬃcult to separate real and monetary
shocks from shocks to the financial trend. Leeper & Nason (2014) comment that we are
not yet there where we can establish an exact empirical feature of the financial cycle.
Though the credit-to-GDP gap frequently are referred to as an indicator for systemic
risk, several authors have commented on its technical weaknesses. Edge & Meisenzahl
(2011) comments on two potential threats to reliability, both essentially tied to how the
gap needs to be measured in real time to be informative for policy action. The first - that
revisions of real time estimates of the gap are large, possibly as large as the measured gap
itself. Second - even if the real time estimate is correct, the indicator includes the real
22The financial cycle is, by BIS, measured using statistical models based on credit aggregates and house
prices.
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time trend estimate, which also is prone to measurement error. The trend is constantly
updated with new figures on total credit and total GDP. This means that the trend line
can change considerably as new data becomes available, causing past measurements of
the indicator to be wrong. This is a consequence of using a one-sided HP-filter and is
called the end point problem. Edge & Meisenzahl (2011) further notes that the unreli-
ability of the real time measures cause a tendency of "false positives" in the credit gap
indicator, rather than "false negatives". This implies that the indicator seems to have a
bias towards predicting excessively high credit levels, which later will be revised down,
rather than the other way around. They explain that these revisions do not stem from
adjustments of the underlying data on GDP or credit, but rather from the unreliability
of the end-of-sample estimate of the trend of Credit-to-GDP. It can be argued that it can
cause an unnecessary burden on banks if these estimates then were to dictate adjustments
in the capital requirements, which later will have to be discarded, as measurements would
be revised down. Edge & Meisenzahl (2011) finds that the potential costs, due to real
time gap mis-measurements can be large.23 Due to these uncertainties with the real time
estimates, Hahm, Mishkin, Shin & Shin (2012) comments that using the credit gap in real
time policy can be expected to present formidable political economy challenges. Increasing
capital requirements, which will spill over on borrowers, could end up being diﬃcult to jus-
tify when the policy action is based on the single indicator of the credit-to-GDP ratio gap.
Drehmann & Tsatsaronis (2014) challenge the criticism, arguing that many, while fac-
tually accurate, misinterpret the role of the credit-to-GDP gap. Specifically, the view
that the indicator is to be used as a common reference guide for countercyclical capital
buﬀer-decisions. Drehmann & Tsatsaronis (2014) notes that the end point problem of
calculating trend values do not invalidate the credit-to-GDP gap ratio and its signaling
ability. They do acknowledge that the indicator is not perfect, but they do claim that the
credit-to-GDP measure is, on average, the best single indicator in this context.
One attempt to improve the predictive ability of the Credit-to-GDP indicator is done
by Gerdrup, Kvinlog & Schaanning (2013). By augmenting the historical data with fore-
casts of the trend, the authors claim this may provide a more robust estimate and hence a
more reliable early warning of a crisis. Based on historical data they find that by simply
taking the average of the credit-to-GDP ratio for the last 4 quarters, and adding a 5
23The costs stems from curtailed lending, and not so much due to increases in interest rates on out-
standing credit.
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year forecast horizon to the data improves the properties of the gap indicator. In Norges
Bank No.1 (2013) the authors observes that owing to this method, the trend is less sensi-
tive to strong growth or an abrupt fall in the indicator at the end of the observation period.
2.4 Macroprudential Tools
As we now have established what separates macroprudential objectives from other macroe-
conomic objectives, we need to make some distinctions regarding the many types of pru-
dential tools. As noted in the introduction there is, according to Elliott et al. (2013),
an emerging consensus taxonomy that divides macroprudential policies into two. Namely
structural and countercyclical policies. Elliott et al. (2013) choose to make their key dis-
tinction among countercyclical tools based on which side of the supply and the demand
of credit they operate on. Limits on borrowers loan-to-value ratios and limits on loan
maturities are examples on the demand side. Limits on deposit rates24, limits on lending
rates, restrictions on banks’ portfolios, reserve requirements and capital requirements are
examples of tools on the supply side. This taxonomy is also used by Claessens & Haber-
meier (2013), though they call it the banking and household sector, instead of supply and
demand respectively. González-Páramo (2012)25 use a diﬀerent taxomony. Their focus is
on the sort of tools whose calibration can be varied over the cycle, so called countercycli-
cal instruments. They classify them into the following three kinds; Capital-based tools,
(such as countercyclical capital buﬀers), liquidity-based tools, (like countercyclical capital
requirements)26, and asset-side-tools,(e.g. LTV- and DTI- ratio caps). This is also in line
with Lim et al. (2011), though they refer to what in the BIS paper is called asset-side
tools as credit-related tools.
Next, I present a number of macroprudential instruments that have been, or are be-
ing used to day. There is a whole range of instruments to chose from, but I have chosen
to focus my attention on tools that are meant to mitigate the cyclical threats, in line
with the classification in Elliott et al. (2013). Further, there are instruments in all of
the three categories, following González-Páramo (2012). That is, capital-, liquidity- and
24Ceiling on deposit rates, to curb credit supply.
25A report submitted by a Working Group established by the Committee on the Global Financial
System. Chaired by José Manuel González-Páramo, then European Central Bank.
26CCB make banks able to drain on equity as a shock occur which cause wide-spread defaults. CCRR
make banks have a liquidity cushion, in case of a run.
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asset-based instruments.
Loan-To-Value (LTV)- and Debt-To-Income (DTI) Ratio Caps
A Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio is a well known measure used by financial institutions and
other lenders to assess the risk of a loan, e.g. a mortgage. A high ratio implies that
the borrower to a large extent finances a real estate transaction via lending. Hence, the
lender is more leveraged. By imposing a cap on this ratio regulators restricts the degree of
leverage borrowers may take The Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratio is the ratio of debt servicing
to income over a certain time period (e.g. month). A cap on this ratio restricts potential
borrowers to take on more debt, if they with the new debt will have a debt service to
income ratio above the regulatory determined cap.
The LTV ratio cap is meant to mitigate systemic risk originating from excessive credit
growth or inflation in asset prices, usually property prices. The introduction of LTV ra-
tios, as well as Debt-service-To-Income (DTI) ratio caps27, stems from boom-bust episodes
and are particularly popular in Asian and European countries (Lim et al. 2011). Caps
on LTV ratios, if implemented early in the cycle, may have a preemptive eﬀect by limit-
ing the broad leverage level in the housing sector, as it limits the value of loans to well
below the current value of the properties. Lim et al. (2011) note that LTV ratio caps
may restrict low income residents and first time buyers access to credit. Therefore, some
countries28 are planning to combine the implementation of LTV ratio caps with policies
to help these residents into the housing market.29 Lim et al. point out that there are
diﬀerences between countries regarding to which degree the LTV ratio caps are broad-
based or targeted30. The LTV ratio cap is not by itself an "automatic stabilizer", so the
optimal use of the instrument may be to implement or increase the ratio cap in periods
of high credit growth, to curb speculation and hence reduce systemic risk. In this way,
the LTV ratio cap will be more potent in smoothing out the cycle (Lim et al. 2011). LTV
ratios have already had some success in a number of countries, notably Hong Kong, Korea
and Poland (Claessens & Habermeier (2013) and Lim et al. (2011)). In addition to LTV
ratio caps, Hong Kong has also implemented DTI ratio caps to curb systemic risk. Hahm
et al. (2012) comments that since the currency of Hong Kong are pegged to the dollar,
27According to Lim et al. (2011), these are usually used in combination.
28Canada, Chile, Hong Kong and the United States.
29Examples being government initiated social housing projects or the requiring of mortgage insurance
for first-time borrowers.
30E.g. depending on the area or the value of the property.
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monetary shocks from the US are directly transmitted into their economy. The use of
additional tools to curb credit and asset price growth are therefore particularly important
to Hong Kong.
Leakages
González-Páramo (2012) mentions the potential leakage of lending from domestic to for-
eign banks as well as into the unregulated banking sector as a consequence of an intro-
duction of LTV- and DTI-ratio caps. Another concern raised in their paper is how an
introduction of asset-side instruments may aﬀect the number of transactions in the real
estate sector, as less people would get access to the market. Especially in geographic
areas with a low number of transactions, this may cause an unintended increase in price
volatility in the real estate market.
When it comes to the impact on output of asset side macroprudential tools González-
Páramo (2012) argues that an overall eﬃciency assessment is diﬃcult to make. This is
due to the fact that there is no empirical evidence of the costs of asset-side tools on the
broader economy. Though it is noted that the costs could be more limited compared to
other forms of macroprudential policy. The reason is that asset-side tools may only aﬀect
a specific proportion of borrowers. Also, the costs will probably be of the non-monetary
sort, as the consequence for these specific borrowers may be that they do not get the
opportunity to buy a house.
Empirical results on LTV ratio caps
Using panel data from 13 countries31 Wong, Fong, Li & Choi (2011) examine how the
mortgage delinquency ratio responds to changes in property prices and macroeconomic
fluctuations, depending on wether LTV policies are present or not. They find that a
one percentage point drop in property prices would increase the delinquency ratio for
economies with LTV policies with 0.35 basis points. For economies without LTV policies,
the result is 1.29 basis points.32 A one percentage point decrease in GDP growth also gives
a lower negative response in the delinquency ratio in economies with LTV polices than in
those without. However this diﬀerence between policy choices is not significantly diﬀerent
31Australia, Canada, Greece, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain,
Thailand, the US and the UK
32The null hypothesis that the two estimates are equal can be rejected at the 10 percentage significance
level.
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from each other, statistically. The analysis in Wong et al. (2011) therefore suggests that
a cap on LTV ratios is eﬀective in dampening systemic risk, stemming from the property
markets. Looking at the results across the countries that have adopted LTV policies,
Wong et al. (2011) comment that although it seems clear that LTV caps in general will
dampen household leverage, evidence that it will have a dampening eﬀect on the activity
in the property market are mixed. This suggests that the eﬀect on systemic risk from
LTV policies are direct, from lower household leverage, and not through a dampening in
the property market.
Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisions
According to Saurina (2009) there is a general experience among banking supervisors that
lending mistakes by banks are more prevalent during upswings. Overconfidence in invest-
ment projects by both borrowers and lenders may lead to lower lending standards and,
in essence, a too low pricing of risk. This (irrationality) works the other way around in a
recession, causing tight credit conditions and a high pricing of risk. This may have real
economic consequences as good and economically well justified investment projects do
not get funding. The realization that this sort of behavior, stemming from informational
imperfections such as disaster myopia and herd behavior prevails, is also the main theo-
retical argument to rationalize an intervention (Saurina 2009). One way to counteract the
procyclicality is by implementing the capital-based macroprudential instrument "dynamic
provisioning"33. Dynamic provisioning encourages banks to set aside provisions based on
expected losses, instead of the usual provisions based on incurred losses (Hannoun 2010).
Through banks’ balance sheets, this might make banks build up more capital in the form
of provisions in upswings, which again makes them more resilient if a negative shock oc-
curs. Also, following a bust, the expected future losses are low and credit should be looser
than without dynamic provisioning. Smoothing banks’ marginal cost of lending over the
cycle will dampen credit growth in booms, and sustain justifiable lending in bust (Lim
et al. 2011).
There are several existing systems with dynamic provisioning, but the most widely used
is a system of countercyclical provisioning with discretionary rate adjustments (Lim
et al. 2011). There are also systems where the provision rates are fixed, and set based on
historical averages of default rates. With the countercyclical adjustments, the imposed
33It is also known as statistical or countercyclical loan-loss provisions
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provisioning rate will be high during upswings, and reduced during downturns. According
to González-Páramo (2012) there is clear evidence that dynamic provisioning improves
the resilience of the whole financial system if it is implemented.
Fernández de Lis & Garcia Herrero (2010) have compared the eﬀects and experiences
from dynamic provisioning in Spain, Columbia and Peru. They conclude that dynamic
provisioning pursues two goals: (i) to smooth credit growth and (ii) to allow for buﬀers to
be build up in good times to be drained on in bad times. They find that when the boom
is of a certain size, the eﬀectiveness of provisions for the first objective in general is lim-
ited. However, they note for the second objective, dynamic provisions seems much more
promising. Regarding the first objective, smoothening the credit cycle, González-Páramo
(2012) is more specific, arguing that the research indicates that it has been eﬀective for
this purpose in Spain, but that it does not seem to have the same eﬀect in Chile and
Colombia.
Countercyclical Capital Requirements
In booms, asset values rise, this in turn supports further lending by banks (Hahm et al.
2012). A fixed regulatory capital requirement may therefore not be very diﬃcult for fi-
nancial institutions to fulfill in a boom. When a bust then hits the financial system, the
value of the assets diminish, inducing banks to increase their capital buﬀers to be able
to comply with the fixed capital requirements. This will potentially be at the expense
of giving credit ((Hahm et al. 2012) and (Akram 2014)). So, a constant capital ade-
quacy ratio could end up working against its purpose, being procyclical and exaggerate
systemic risk. That is, even though they seem appropriate from a microprudential view,
as the individual institutions appear more resilient with higher capital ratios (Jeanne &
Korinek 2014). The basic idea behind the countercyclical capital requirements is therefore
to require financial institutions to hold more capital in good times and lower the regula-
tory capital requirement in bad times (Hannoun 2010). In this way, during a boom, the
tightening of the capital requirement will bolster banks’ financial strength and at the same
time potentially have a dampening eﬀect on credit growth (Riiser 2012). A release of the
imposed capital ratio in a downturn would mitigate pressure on financial institutions to
deleverage, and thus mitigate the potential amplification mechanism forced deleveraging
throughout the financial system can have on the real economy (Adrian et al. 2013).
Norges Bank No.1 (2013) discusses the general eﬀects of an increase in capital require-
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ments on bank behavior.34 It is argued that banks, given that they do not already satisfy
the regulations, roughly have two ways to meet them. Firstly, banks may increase their
equity capital. This can be done by retaining earnings (as opposed to distributing these
as dividends) and/or issue new shares. To the extent that it is more expensive to fund
lending through equity than other sources (e.g wholesale funding) banks’ cost for funding
might increase. In turn, these higher costs may be passed through to borrowers, who will
see a higher interest rate on their debt. So, an implementation or increase in the capital
requirements on banks might dampen the volume of extended credit via higher interest
rates, which may lower the demand for credit. Secondly, banks can reduce the denom-
inator of the ratio, their risk-weighted assets. This can be done by either a reduction
in overall lending and by that reducing credit supply, or by altering the composition of
assets toward assets with less risk weight. This may decrease credit supply to only some
sectors of the economy.
Leakages
Norges Bank No.1 (2013) notes that an important transmission mechanism for adjust-
ments in capital requirements onto the economy is via changes in market interest rates
faced by borrowers. However, the possibilities for arbitrage and leakages do exist (González-
Páramo 2012). If capital requirements on banks are increased, the shortfall in credit due
to a lower supply of credit by banks and increased interest rates could be taken up by
non-bank institutions or internationally active banks. These international banks may not
be subject to the increased requirements. Large borrowers might also substitute bank
credit with the issuance of bonds, or similar instruments. In this way credit growth in
the economy may not be significantly dampened. In González-Páramo (2012) the possi-
bility of outright regulatory arbitrage is also discussed. It is noted that banks may try
to dampen the impact of the requirements by adjusting their internal models, whereafter
these models will generate lower risk-weights on their assets. This incentive may appear
stronger the tighter the capital requirements are.
Empirical results on countercyclical capital requirements
Using a macroeconometric model which includes several relationships between financial
and real variables, Akram (2014) investigates the impact on macro variables of an increase
in capital requirements on banks using Norwegian data. Examples of interactions between
34See "Concepts" for further elaboration and details regarding the new capital requirements
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financial and real variables are house prices and credit to households, and the correlation
between lending rates and changes in the capital adequacy ratios. This latter interaction
is, according to Akram, a novel feature of this model, as the implementation of capital
requirements in macroeconometric models are rare. There are four main results Akram
highlights in his analysis.
First higher capital requirements do have a mitigating eﬀect on credit growth, real estate
prices and other macroeconomic variables. Importantly though, these eﬀects are not
direct as the the direct eﬀects are insignificant. The eﬀects comes through higher
lending rates, which is a response from the banks when higher capital requirements
are implemented.
Second the eﬀect on credit growth and real estate prices are considerable, while the
impact on variables such as inflation and output are rather modest.
Third the model predicts that for most types of shocks, the optimal response in the
countercyclical capital buﬀer is an increase of 2,5 percentage points. Depending on
the persistence of the shocks, the optimal duration of the increase is between 1-12
quarters.
Fourth the countercyclical capital buﬀer that minimizes the variance in credit growth
also minimizes a combination of the variances of credit growth and output. This
shows that one should not encounter any big conflicts with regard to policy choices, if
the variance of credit growth is included in the policymakers loss function. According
to Akram (2014), this result is due to a strong correlation between credit growth,
output growth and inflation. However, Akram (2014) notes that this outcome should
be investigated by other models before any conclusions can be made.
Though the estimated eﬀects on inflation and output are rather modest in response to
an increase in capital requirements, Akram comments that the impact on these variables
may be larger if Norway’s trading partners were to implement higher capital requirements
at the same time as Norway.
González-Páramo (2012) refers to a study by The Basel Committee, which estimates
that a one percentage point rise in capital requirements leads to a 20-30 percentage point
reduction in the annual probability of a systemic crisis (Long-term Economic Impact As-
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sessment (LEI Basel Committee (2010))).35 They do however stress that the marginal
eﬀect of increasing capital requirements is decreasing. The authors of the study com-
ment that they do not try to gauge an optimal level of capital requirements, but they do
claim that measured in output, there is considerable room to tighten capital and liquidity
requirements while still getting a positive net benefit. Another study, by the Macroeco-
nomic Assessment Group (MAG 2010) at The Bank for International Settlements, found
that a one percentage point increase in the capital requirement on banks leads to decline
in lending of 1-2 percentage points in the medium run, relative to a baseline forecast.36
The results are estimated using a range of models and the estimate reported here is the
median result.
The MAG study also estimated the impact a one percentage point increase in capital re-
quirements would have on the growth in GDP. The results suggested that in the medium
term, the annual GDP growth rate decreases with 0.04 percentage point, relative to the
baseline forecast, for so to catch up towards baseline. The maximum decline in GDP was
0.19 percentage points below the baseline path. The LEI study found that a one percent-
age point increase in capital requirements decreases long-run output by 0.09 percentage
points. It is important to note though, that the positive eﬀects of a reduction in the sever-
ity and frequency of banking crisis has not been taken into account in either calculation.37
Another attempt to uncover the eﬀects of capital requirements is done by Clerc, Derviz,
Mendicino, Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez & Vardoulakis (2012). They have devel-
oped a DSGE model to analyze how capital requirements aﬀects the steady state and the
transmission of various types of shocks in an economy. The model exhibit "three layers
of defaults", as bankers, households and corporations all can end up defaulting on their
debt. Bankers are financed by their own wealth (inside equity) and by deposits from sav-
ing households. Banks are lending to households and to corporations. As defaults have
a material impact on the balance sheet of the lender in this model, the model display
the impact of household and corporate defaults on the net worth of banks. Three main
results stands out in their model. First, they find that there is an optimal level of capital
requirements. Higher capital requirements reduce bank leverage and hence their risk of
35As an example, the LEI-study finds that increasing the capital ratio from 7 to 8 percentage points,
decreases the annual probability of a systemic crisis from 4.1 to 2.8 percent.
36The baseline forecast is the forecast without an adjustment in capital requirements.
37LEI estimates that net results are positive for a range of increases in minimum capital ratios, relative
to Basel II.
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defaulting. An increase in capital requirements also reduce banks’ implicit subsidy that
a deposit insurance is.38 Lower leverage means that banks, to a larger extent must be
financed by equity, so banks funding costs increase with capital requirements. The higher
funding costs may be passed on to borrowers. Hence, banks will extend less credit to
a higher interest rate. This shows that there is an optimal level of capital requirements
because too high levels imply that credit will be too restricted (Also, banking activities
might be pushed into other, unregulated sectors). Clerc et al. (2012) do however not
comment on what this optimal level of capital requirements is, or what it would be char-
acterized by. Second, Clerc et al. (2012) find that the higher degree of leverage there is in
banks, the more responsive is the economy to shocks. This may not surprise, but it implies
that limited liability and deposit insurance constitute a potentially powerful channel of
financial amplification. Third, countercyclical adjustments of capital requirements may
improve the benefits of high capital requirements. Following a shock and the release of
the accumulated capital, the buﬀer is meant to sustain credit supply and keep rates down
even though defaults by borrowers are increasing. However, if the buﬀer is too low, banks
may still see a rise in funding costs oﬀ-setting the intended impact the adjustment of
the countercyclical capital requirement was meant to have. This issue is also commented
on by Anil Kashyap39, who notes that for regulatory capital requirements to matter, the
level of capital in good times must be higher than the levels imposed by the market in
bad times. Due to the often considerable uncertainty that prevails in periods of financial
turmoil, the market might demand very high capital ratios in banks before their solvency
are not being questioned. This brings to mind another mechanism the market exhibits
in times of financial distress, namely the signaling eﬀect interventions in the market may
have on its participants. Could it be that simply releasing the regulatory buﬀer cause
enough uncertainty to amplify the downturn, causing fire sales and ultimately lead to
bank runs?
Reserve Requirements
Hahm et al. (2012) explain that reserve requirements is a traditional form of capital con-
trols, where the central bank requires banks to deposit a certain fraction of their raised
38The existence of deposit insurance may make depositors less concerned with how leveraged their bank
is. Because their deposits are insured, depositors will do not have the incentive to make sure their banks
are solid. This mechanism may make banks take higher risk, in terms of a higher leverage ratio, if there
is a deposit insurance.
39Lecture held in the Northwestern Advanced Workshop for Central Bankers in 2014
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capital in the central bank. Reserve requirements is by Lim et al. (2011) characterized
as a liquidity-related instrument. That means that the purpose of the instrument is to
make financial institutions hold a certain amount of liquid assets. However classified as
liquidity-related, imposing reserve requirements may also help build up capital buﬀers, as
well as having a direct impact on credit growth. As such, reserve requirements may be
eﬀective both in terms of limiting expansions and mitigating declines.
One disadvantage of reserve requirements as a macroprudential tool is that it only applies
to banks, rather than the wider group of financial institutions that use non-core liabil-
ities for funding. As such, implementation of reserve requirements might push some of
the bank-activity into other institutions than banks, creating systemic risk on their own
(Hahm et al. 2012).
Lim et al. (2011) comment that reserve requirements usually are used in a quite tar-
geted fashion. Examples being that they are diﬀerentiated by currency, maturity or types
of liabilities the institution has. Further, reserve requirements are usually applied within
a band, on a marginal basis or imposed if credit growth exceeds an oﬃcial limit. For
optimal use, Lim et al. (2011) note that reserve requirements should be increased during
expansions and lowered, if not removed entirely during a bust. Brazil, China, Russia and
Turkey are some countries that have introduced reserve requirements. For example, in
2011, Brazil imposed an unremunerated reserve requirement of 60 percent on all banks’
short term debt in foreign currency, exceeding Tier 1 capital or $3 billion (whichever was
lower).40 As such, Hahm et al. (2012) argue that this sort of requirement also may be
regarded as a tax on banks liabilities. Another example showing how reserve requirements
are used on the margin is from Bulgaria. Prior to the EU accession, banks that exceeded
the 6 percent per quarter credit growth by more than 2 percent had to set aside as much
as 400 percent in reserves on these loans.
Empirical research on reserve requirements
Claessens et al. (2014) refer to a study on banks’ response to a big and unexpected increase
in reserve requirements in Uruguay in 2008, as an eﬀort to try to find which eﬀects reserve
requirements may have on the financial sector. The study found that credit growth on
the aggregate did go down as a response to the policy, but credit to more risky firms
40It is unremunerated as the reserves must be kept in the central bank, without yielding any interest.
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increased. The conclusion was therefore ambiguous, as less credit not necessarily imply
less systemic risk. When it comes to the impact on output, the LEI study find that
meeting the liquidity standards41 proposed by the Basel Committee will reduce steady
state output by 0.08 percentage points. However, including the benefits of reducing the
severity and frequency of banking crisis, the net benefit is calculated to be a net increase
in steady state output of 0.68 percentage points.
Instruments Targeting Foreign Currency Borrowing
The macroprudential toolkit does also include measures to limit system-wide currency mis-
matches (Galati & Moessner 2013). This is especially relevant for emerging economies,
as they tend to be more prone to high volatility in their currency valuations. Galati &
Moessner (2013) note that large capital inflows may fuel domestic credit growth. Hence,
policy measures meant to mitigate these capital inflows may be seen as a macroprudential
tool, as they indirectly mitigate overall credit growth. This issue is highly relevant, as
low interest rates in developed countries in the last years have triggered an increase in
foreign currency borrowing by non-financial corporations in emerging market economies
(EMEs) (Chui, Fender & Sushko 2014). Chui et al. report that private sector borrowers
(other than banks) in major EMEs have more than doubled their foreign currency debt
in the period 2009-12, compared to the four-year period prior to the financial crisis. They
also refer to the recent development in Ukraine, who has seen a deterioration in the value
of its currency, to illustrate how abruptly the economic situation in such countries may
change. The risk arises when domestic borrowers who are paid in domestic currency take
up loans in foreign currency. If a depreciation occur, as typically happens in a crisis, the
debt relative to income and wealth spikes. If the practice of foreign currency borrowing
is widespread, default rates might be high. In turn these defaults could drag banks down
with them. Foreign currency debt can thus work as an amplification mechanism.
Lim et al. (2011) explain that several countries use macroprudential instruments to miti-
gate this form of risk. There are measures to limit foreign currency exposure and by that
reduce the risk of amplification, and measures meant to build buﬀers so that if a crisis
materializes, the system is more resilient. In the first category, measures include direct
41These standards can not directly be interpreted as an increase in reserve requirements. The propo-
sition is that banks must meet a minimum level of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which is the
ratio of stable funding to weighted long-term assets. This requirement is however to be regarded as a
liquidity-based macroprudential instrument, in the same way as reserve requirements.
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caps on exposures, debt service-to-income caps by currency and in extreme cases outright
bans on foreign borrowing.42 Examples of measures in the second category are higher
risk weights43 or higher capital requirements when lending foreign currency, and higher
provision standards against foreign currency lending.
There are mixed evidence of the eﬀectiveness measures on foreign exchange lending has
on credit growth. Applied on its own, they seem eﬀective at reducing credit growth, but
this eﬀect weakens when other measures are included (Lim et al. 2011). According to Lim
et al., one measure that is eﬀective is limits on net open positions on foreign currency
exposure.44 This reduces the whole domestic financial systems external indebtedness and
by that reduce the overall risk.
The Pigouvian Debt Tax
The motivation for implementing a Pigouvian debt tax is that borrowers impose a pe-
cuniary externality on the financial system, as they drive up collateral prices, fueling
additional borrowing. Bianchi & Mendoza (2013) show that agents in a competitive equi-
librium borrow "too much", because of this externality. Further, it is showed that by
imposing a state-contingent tax on debt, this externality is internalized. Imposing the
debt tax removes fat tails from the distribution of returns and reduce risk premiums.
Bianchi & Mendoza (2013) further comment that varying the tax, depending on wether
one are in an upswing or in a crisis is more eﬀective than a fixed tax, as a fixed rate
debt tax is less eﬀective in reducing the severity of a crisis, compared to a varying one.
Jeanne & Korinek (2010) come to the same conclusion and show that the optimal level
of the tax should be dropped to zero in busts and rise to approximately half a percent-
age point, on total debt, in a boom. Here they diﬀer from Bianchi & Mendoza (2013),
who though agreeing that the tax should be reduced to zero in a crisis, find that the tax
should be raised to as much as four and a half percentage point the year prior to the crisis.
Hahm et al. (2012) also discuss the possibility of a debt tax and refer to Korea, who
in 2010 announced their Macroprudential Levy on banks’ foreign exchange-denominated
liabilities. Thus, Hahm et al. diﬀers from other discussions of a debt tax, as they focus
on banks. Specifically, they discuss a macroprudential tax on banks’ non-core liabilities.
42Austria between 2008 and 2010, and Brazil since mid 2000s (Lim et al. 2011)
43In Croatia the risk weights are up to 150 percent (Lim et al. 2011)
44Limits on how much debt, net of assets one can be liable to in foreign currency.
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For banks, non-core liabilities will be other liabilities than deposits, such as wholesale
funding and debt to other institutions. The argument is that banks’ non-core liabilities
follow the stage of the financial cycle, because banks’ non-core liabilities correlates with
the under-pricing of risk which in turn follow the financial cycle. As explained in the
section Measuring systemic risk, a high wholesale funding ratio in banks represents a risk
because the banks are more exposed to the risk of fire-sales and maturity mismatches.This
may also be why Norges Bank uses the wholesale funding ratio in credit institutions as
an indicator for systemic risk. A tax on these liabilities can help to align incentives,
much in the same way as other authors argue in favor of a debt tax on borrowers. By
targeting non-core liabilities only, the levy/tax addresses the externalities associated with
excessive asset growth. It is a Pigouvian tax as it reduces the systemic risk by aligning
banks’ incentives with the socially optimum. As such, the revenue raised by the tax is a
secondary issue. Another desirability of the levy is that it, according to Hahm et al., do
not need discretionary adjustments over the cycle. They claim that the base of the levy
varies with the cycle, and hence bite hardest during the boom. This gives the tax the
property of being an automatic stabilizer.
Comparative Empirical Results on Macroprudential Tools
Lim et al. (2011) presents a panel regression analysis which aims to contribute to the
discussion of which macroprudential instruments are more eﬃcient in limiting diﬀerent
sources of risk stemming from the financial sector. The regression uses data from 49
countries during a 10-year period, from 2000 to 2010. Specifically, eight instruments45
are estimated to see if they have an impact on the procyclicality of leverage and credit.
The degree of procyclicality is measured by the correlation between GDP growth and the
growth rate in the aggregated measures for credit and leverage respectively. In the re-
gression analysis, credit growth is measured as the logarithm change in aggregated claims
on the private sector, held by financial institutions. Leverage is defined as assets over
equity for financial institutions. By adding an interaction term of GDP and a dummy for
the instrument, a negative coeﬃcient implies that the instrument has a mitigating eﬀect
on the procyclicality. Additional regressions are also added. There the goals are to find
out whether two other instruments46 have any impact on risk stemming from common
exposure by institutions. Proxies for two types of risk are the ratio of foreign liabilities
45Limits on credit growth, reserve requirements, dynamic provisioning, limits on foreign currency lend-
ing, counctercyclical capital requirements, restrictions on profit distribution, LTV- and DTI-ratio caps.
46Limits on net open positions and limits on maturity mismatch.
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to foreign assets and total credit to total deposits, which are meant to reflect risk related
to liquidity and capital flows respectively.
In all regressions it is controlled for the degree of economic development, exchange rate
regime and the size of the financial sector. From the results of the regression analysis it is
clear that the eﬃcacy of the diﬀerent instruments depends on where in the economy the
risk stems from. The following general lessons are emphasized in Lim et al. (2011).
• Risk stemming from the procyclicality of credit is best addressed with credit-related
instruments such as caps on LTV- and DTI-ratios. A LTV ratio cap nearly elimi-
nates all of the procyclicality in credit growth, while a cap on DTI actually makes
credit growth slightly countercyclical. This implies that quarterly credit growth
decreases in response to an increase in economic growth. Additionally, reserve re-
quirements and dynamic provisioning also seem to have an impact on mitigating
credit growth.
• For risk arising from excessive leverage, capital-related instruments might be a good
option. Countercyclical capital requirements, dynamic provisioning and reserve re-
quirements can mitigate increases in leverage in booms and provide institutions with
a buﬀer. As the eﬀect of DTI-ratio caps on the procyclicality of credit, the eﬀects
of an implementation of countercyclical capital requirements, dynamic provisioning
or reserve requirements are found to make leverage growth countercyclical. These
eﬀects are found to be significant on a one percentage point significance level. It
is commented that in the regression, the instruments are only estimated as dummy
variables. Hence, the results do not give any information regarding what levels these
instruments needs to be set at, to eliminate the procyclicalities.
• To address systemic liquidity risk, liquidity-related instruments such as limits on
foreign currency exposure, if the risk stems from foreign currency borrowing, and
limits on maturity mismatch can be used. Though not covered in the regression
analysis, the authors suggests that a levy on non-core liabilities, a Pigouvian tax
on financial institutions’ debt, also can be a good measure if wholesale funding is a
significant source of funding for financial institutions.
Claessens et al. (2014) comment that most empirical studies on macroprudential policy
takes an aggregate perspective. That is, they are investigating the impact of macropru-
dential policy on aggregated variables in the financial sector, such as total credit growth or
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asset price growth. The above presented study by Lim et al. being one of them. Claessens
et al. (2014), on the other hand, has a diﬀerent approach. They study how policy measures
might influence at the micro-level. That is, how macroprudential policies influence the
build-up of vulnerabilities in individual banks’ balance sheets. There are many channels
through which banks can become vulnerable. In an upswing, where lending accelerates,
banks become more leveraged. They finance the increased lending with an increase in
non-core liabilities (such as wholesale funding) and can thus, to a larger extent, become
exposed to foreign exchange risk and risk attached to maturity mismatches.
Using some 18,000 observations on approximately 2800 banks in 48 countries over the
period 2000-2010, Claessens et al. (2014) analyze the eﬀectiveness of various macropru-
dential tools in curbing asset growth. They divide the tools into four diﬀerent categories
and compare the results. The groups are; tools aimed at borrowers (debt service-to-
income- and loan-to-value ratio caps), banks’ assets or liabilities (limits on credit growth,
foreign currency credit growth and reserve requirements), policies that encourages the
build-up of countercyclical capital buﬀers (countercyclical capital requirements, dynamic
provisioning and profits distribution restrictions) and a final group of miscellaneous poli-
cies, which has some overlap with the three other categories.
The results imply that policies aimed at borrowers are eﬀective in reducing the build-
up of vulnerabilities in the banking system. The policies aimed at banks’ assets and
liabilities, as well as the measures from the "other" group seems to be even more eﬀec-
tive. However, the instruments meant to encourage the build-up of capital buﬀers are not
eﬀective, according to the authors.47 One reason for this result could be that the depen-
dent variable is banks’ asset growth. Measures implemented to create capital buﬀers are
not just meant to reduce the buildup of vulnerabilities, but also to mitigate a potential
decline in financial intermediation following a bust. For the most part, these results are in
line with the study in Lim et al. (2011). However, there are some interesting diﬀerences.
The eﬀect of countercyclical capital requirements and dynamic provisioning are in Lim et.
al found to have a dampening eﬀect on the total growth in leverage in financial institu-
tions. The results in Claessens et. al, on the other hand, suggests that these instruments
are not eﬀective in mitigating their measure for bank risk. However, In Claessens et al.,
47The coeﬃcient describing the eﬀect of "financial institutions buﬀer-based instruments" (Reserve
requirements, Dynamic provisioning and Countercyclical capital requirements) on mitigating banks’ asset
growth is not significantly diﬀerent from zero at any reasonable sign.level
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the dependent variable is asset growth in banks, while the dependent variables in Lim et
al are quarterly growth in credit, measured as claims on the private sector, and quarterly
leverage growth, measured as banks’ assets as a ratio to their capital. So, these results
can not be directly compared to each other.48
3 Monetary and Macroprudential policy
In 1952, Jan Tinbergen put forth what we now call the "Tinbergen principle". It states
that policymakers need at least one independent policy tool for each independent pol-
icy goal (Tinbergen 1952). According to Hannoun (2010) monetary and fiscal policy are
meant to stabilize prices and manage demand so, following the "Tinbergen principle",
there is a need for additional tools to maintain financial stability. Hannoun does spec-
ify that it is not necessary that each policy tool are to be exclusively assigned to one
objective alone, but he does claim that the number of tools must equal the number of
objectives. It can be argued, as Hannoun does, that both monetary and fiscal policy can
be used to sustain financial stability. Monetary policy by leaning against the credit cycle
and fiscal policy through building up fiscal buﬀers that can be used to boost demand as
a response to financial system stress. Accordingly, Hannoun believes fiscal and monetary
policy should incorporate financial stability as a secondary objective, because financial
stability contributes to the realization of their primary objective. With regard to mon-
etary policy, which is the focus of this thesis, Woodford concludes, in Woodford (2012),
that the prevalent inflation targeting framework should be adapted to take into account
the risk of financial instability and react upon developments in the financial sector that
may increase the risk of a crisis. However, Woodford states that it hardly can be argued
that interest-rate policy can or should provide a "complete solution" to the problem of
handling systemic risk. He notes that that assumption would only hold if one believes not
only that monetary policy is very eﬀective in dealing with financial distortions, but also
that it would carry no costs to implement financial stability into the mandate of interest
rate policy. According to Woodford, that last assumption would simply not hold.
With its implementation questions regarding how macroprudential policy will interact
with other policy areas have arisen. I have looked more closely on how the interaction be-
tween macroprudential and monetary policy is discussed in the literature. Further, based
48It is commented in Claessens et al. (2014) that they in their study also analyzed the macroprudential
instruments’ and their eﬀects on banks’ leverage, but they did not find any strong results.
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on a discussion between Michael Woodford and Lars Svensson, I discuss how their two
alternatives for the role of monetary policy to address financial instability may impact
the economy, in light of existing empirical and theoretical research.
3.1 The overlapping eﬀect
Cecchetti & Kohler (2014) state that at the macroeconomic level, macroprudential and
monetary policy have quite a bit in common when the goal is the conventional monetary
policy objective of price and output stability. Their highlighted example is how the eﬀect,
on banks, of an increase in the key policy rate coincides with the eﬀect of increasing the
amount of capital banks are required to hold, as a ratio to their assets. When increasing
the policy rate, the level of bank reserves and bank deposits decrease, resulting in a low-
ering of the supply of credit (Cecchetti & Kohler 2014). Increasing capital requirements
may also have the eﬀect of reducing aggregate credit. To increase their capital as a ratio to
their risk-weighted assets, banks must either increase capital directly or they can reduce
their holdings of assets. An increase in capital can be done by increasing lending rates,
which have the consequence of lowering credit supply. Alternatively, banks can reduce
their assets, which will also lower credit supply. Either way, credit will be reduced when
capital requirements are increased. Additionally, the cost of financing through equity is
higher than financing via debt (Billi & Vredin 2014). If the bank defaults, holders of
equity are repaid after debt holders. Therefore, it is to be expected that holders of equity
will demand a higher return than creditors, and hence the higher cost for banks to finance
its assets through equity. To some extent the results in N’Diaye (2009) supports this
notion. N’Diaye (2009) argues and shows that by implementing a countercyclical capital
adequacy ratio, the central bank can obtain the same objectives, in terms of output and
inflation, but with less adjustments in the policy rate. Thus, in an economic boom, where
prices are increasing, raising capital requirements may mitigate price growth, via reduced
credit, such that the policy rate do not need to be elevated as much as usual to meet the
inflation target. This means that in a situation where the financial and business cycle are
aligned, macroprudential and monetary policy can complement each other.
This line of thought confirms the theory and empirical results presented earlier show-
ing that macroprudential policy may aﬀect the goals of monetary policy. Specifically,
credit growth is a determinant factor for the evolution in total economic activity and
hence also aﬀects price growth. As commented by Claessens & Habermeier (2013) this
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can give rise to policy errors, as policymakers might wrongly estimate the extent to which
for example an implementation or adjustment in reserve requirements may dampen ag-
gregate demand and inflation, and thus make the wrong interest rate response. Claessens
and Habermeier puts forth Turkey as a possible example. According to them, policymak-
ers in Turkey overestimated the extent to which their increase in reserve requirements
on banks would dampen aggregate demand and inflation, and thus did not increase the
policy rate suﬃciently in response to inflationary pressure.
3.2 The potential for conflict between Monetary and Macropru-
dential policy
In diﬀerence from the example presented in the last subsection, were the business and
credit cycle were aligned, there may also be situations of the opposite. Then, due to
the overlapping eﬀect of macroprudential and monetary policy, responses might conflict.
In this way, macroprudential policy may work in a procyclical way, with regard to the
business cycle. The following example shows how macroprudential policy may interact
with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; Conditions in the macroeconomy
require a looser monetary policy, but a regulatory countercyclical capital buﬀer is im-
plemented to counter rising systemic risk. The looser monetary policy will lower banks’
funding costs, generating an increase in bank capital via retained earnings. This is meant
to foster an increase in the supply of credit, to boost the economy. But as a consequence
of the implemented capital requirements, the increase in banks’ capital, resulting from
the looser monetary policy, might be directed into meeting the capital standards, rather
than towards the economy as increased supply of credit (González-Páramo 2012)49. If the
conditions in the economy are suﬃciently poor and the implemented capital requirements
have a negative eﬀect on output and inflation, this may increase the probability of mon-
etary policy being constrained by the lower bound on the interest rate.
Another line of thought, regarding the potential for conflict between the two policy areas
is presented in Beau, Clerc & Mojon (2012). As in the example presented in González-
Páramo (2012), the policy rate is lowered to meet downward pressure on the price level
following an initial increase in capital requirements. Beau et al. (2012) comment that the
lowering of the interest rate might sow the seed for new risk, through the "risk-taking
49page 60
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channel" of monetary policy. Thus, paradoxically an initial tightening in macropruden-
tial policy, to reduce risk, might then increase risk-taking by banks, due to lower interest
rates. 50
However, González-Páramo (2012) finds that because financial crisis’ tends to occur with
a lower frequency than the business cycles, conflicts are not necessarily very likely to
happen on a regular basis. This is also emphasized in Beau et al. (2012). When evaluat-
ing their econometric results based on historical data (1985-2009) on the euro area, they
conclude that episodes of conflict between monetary and macroprudential policy should
be rather limited, on average, over the business cycle.
Nonetheless, if concluding that macroprudential policy does have an impact on the goals
of monetary policy, either directly or through lending rates, and the policy rate aﬀects
financial stability, coordination of the two policies may make it easier to pursue all three
objectives of price stability, output stability and financial stability (Hahm et al. 2012).
3.3 Organizing Monetary and Macroprudential policy
One might think that the division of policy mandates does not matter for the optimal
conduct of macroprudential and monetary policy in combination. However, if the two
policies influence each others goals, it may be economic gains from coordination. One
way to coordinate policy would be to give both mandates (monetary and macropudential
policy) to one institution. On the other hand, such a concentration of power may carry
costs in itself.
At every level in policy, there are ponderations between diﬀerent goals. Reaching one
goal might go on accord with, or at least slow down the achievement of other goals. To
illustrate, consider a state of a sudden increase in prices, due to imported inflation. The
monetary policy response will be to increase the policy rate, to curb that inflation. This
may have a negative aﬀect on output through several channels, but also through the credit
channel. The macroprudential regulator observes the fall in credit growth and respond
50According to Agur & Demertzis (2013), the main mechanisms through which the risk-taking cannel
is thought to work are: valuation eﬀects (collateral gains value from expansive policy such as a reduction
in the policy rate, expanding credit-constraints), a search for yield (fund managers seek higher risk to
maintain promised yields as the yield on safer assets decline with the interest rate) and cheaper short
term debt (which raises incentives for increased leveraging).
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with a release of the capital buﬀer imposed on banks and by lifting the Loan-To-Value
ratio cap on lending. This easing in macroprudential policy is meant to increase credit
growth. It may however also contribute to an increase in the very inflation the central
bank is trying to curb. This example is in line with one of the main results in De Paoli
& Paustian (2013). They find that if the macroprudential instrument used is too similar
to that of the monetary authority, in terms of eﬀect on the economy, the potential costs
of lack of coordination between policy institutions can be considerable.
Next, I will present a very simple model51 meant to highlight how diﬀerent assumptions
regarding monetary and macroprudential policy and their eﬀectiveness in reaching their
respective goals influence optimal policy actions. The model may also give some insights
into how the use of instruments should be coordinated. The model may also oﬀer some
insight into how policy responses might diﬀer, depending on whether policy is coordinated
or not. A benchmark model is given by;
x1 =  r    b+ u1 0 <   < 1
x2 =  ↵r   b+ u2 0 < ↵ < 1
Here x1 and x2 are the functions whose value give the divergence from optima, for mon-
etary and macroprudential policy respectively. r is the interest rate, b is the macropru-
dential policy tool and u1 and u2 are shocks to the monetary and macroprudential goals
respectively. If one institution has the mandate to achieve both objectives of financial
stability and price stability, then policy is more easily and naturally coordinated. The
loss-function, where both objectives carry the same weight will be;
L = x21 + x
2
2
Minimizing with respect to to b and r gives the following optimal policy reactions to the
shocks;
r =
1
1   ↵(u1    u2)
b =
1
1   ↵( ↵u1 + u2)
51The model is a result of a conversation with Øistein Røisland.
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As is clear from the solutions, monetary and macroprudential policy should move in op-
posite directions in response to shocks when there is full coordination, no uncertainty and
no costs attached to the adjustment of the policy tools.52 This is also found to be the
optimal policy response in the model presented in Collard, Dellas, Diba & Loisel (2012).
They find that in response to a shock in bank risk taking incentives, which would be
the equivalent to a positive value of u2 in the model presented above, optimal prudential
policy is to increase the minimum capital requirement on banks. The optimal monetary
policy response is to reduce the policy rate, in order to curb the increase in bank lending
rates, which is the banks response to the initial increased capital requirements. In this
way inflation are virtually unchanged and the overall eﬀect on output is small.
With regard to the optimal organization of mandates, there are two main results from
the model presented. Firstly, in a very simple framework separation of mandates and a
dual-mandate institution yields the same optimal policy response function. We get this
result because it is assumed that both policymakers know what the response of the other
policymaker will be, and takes that response as a given when making their own decisions.
Hence, the responses with no coordination will be equal as in the case of full coordination,
as there is no uncertainty about either institutions’ policy. Secondly, the result where
separation of mandates yields the same optimal response functions only applies under cer-
tain conditions. If adjustment costs or uncertainty of the instruments eﬀects are included,
the optimal response functions under separation of mandates will diﬀer from the dual-
mandate organization. Cecchetti & Kohler (2014) have a similar analysis and compare the
outcomes of three diﬀerent organizations of the two policy tools. The two models do how-
ever part on central assumptions. For one, monetary policy in Cecchetti & Kohler (2014)
wish to achieve two goals (price and output stability), in addition to financial stability.
In the model presented above, monetary policy is only concerned with price stability in
addition to financial stability. Cecchetti & Kohler (2014) evaluate "no coordination",
which constitute a state of two diﬀerent institutions only concerned with their individual
goals of either financial or price stability. They look at "full coordination", where both
institutions fully internalize the other instrument when adjusting their own instrument,
like in a Nash equilibrium. Lastly they consider "partial coordination", which is two
institutions with separate goals, but where one policymaker moves first, and the second
takes the first made policy into consideration when conducting their response. They find
that in the first case, no coordination, regardless of which instrument is assigned to which
52Results may be diﬀerent if these assumptions do not hold.
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objective, the first-best solution can not be achieved.53 In the full coordination case, the
first-best solution is attainable and this case is considered to be the optimal organization
in Cecchetti & Kohler (2014). As in the "no coordination" case, partial coordination is
always inferior to an organization of full coordination. Interestingly though, they find that
the partial coordination case can cause higher losses than the no coordination case. The
assumption is that macroprudential policy moves first and are within-period committed.
Then monetary policy adjusts, taking the move from the macroprudential authority into
consideration. By observing the macroprudential policymaker’s choice, monetary policy
may undermine the eﬀect of the macroprudential response if the two policy objectives
conflicts following a shock. The goal for the macroprudential instrument in Cecchetti and
Kohler is to minimize the spread between lending and deposit rates. It follows from the
solution of the model that a loosening of the macroprudential instrument will lower this
spread. Following a demand shock the interest spread will increase due to higher demand
for credit. The response will be a loosening of the macroprudential instrument. However,
this conflicts with monetary policy which uses inflation as its indicator. If the demand
shock creates higher inflation, monetary policy will raise the policy rate, which in turn
may widen the interest spread. If macroprudential policy in Cecchetti & Kohler (2014)
rather tried to minimize the credit gap instead of the interest rate spread, this conflict
may have been avoided as the policy responses then might complement each other (macro-
prudential policy would be tightened in response to the demand shock), as explained in
the chapter The overlapping eﬀect.
So, both Cecchetti and Kohler, and the very simple model discussed above suggests that
the optimal way of organizing macroprudential and monetary policy is by coordinating
policy measures. That may be most easily implemented by giving one institution the
mandate to control both the traditional monetary policy goals and financial stability,
with the use of both monetary and macroprudential policy measures. Bryant, Henderson
& Becker (2012) is in line when arguing that as a general principle, there are potential
gains from coordination. On the other hand, it is commented that there may be "political
costs" with an organization of coordinated policy. A system of decentralized decisions
53This is in diﬀerence from the result in the simple model inspired by Røisland, which found that the
first-best solution was attainable, given certain conditions, also for the case of "no cooperation". It is the
diﬀerence in the assumptions that cause this diﬀerence in the results. In Cecchetti and Kohler, monetary
policy does not take into account how the macroprudential instrument might be adjusted, when diﬀerent
types of shocks occur.
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without cooperation and information sharing may be justified with the arguments of in-
creased accountability, improved specialization of function and the avoidance of an undue
concentration of power in one institution. These political gains must however outweigh
the economic benefits from coordinated policy decisions.
Giving one institution a dual-mandate could also create another problem, not covered
by the broad political economy argument presented in Bryant et al. (2012). Specifically,
a time-inconsistency problem might arise. Ueda & Valencia (2014) refer to Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) when they present their model of a dual-
mandate central bank, in charge of both price and financial stability. In their model,
because the central bank has the incentive to create inflation following a financial shock,
to reduce the real burden of debt (private sector leverage is a variable in the loss-function),
a dual mandate central bank does not deliver the socially optimal solution. There will
be an inflation bias following a bust in the financial sector. Though, this result hinges on
the assumption that macroprudential policy can not be adjusted as frequently as mon-
etary policy. Nevertheless, the result in Ueda & Valencia (2014) does contribute to the
important question of how to formulate the mandate of securing financial stability.
3.4 "Leaning against the wind" in Monetary policy
The models discussed in section 3.4 assumed that monetary policy could have some eﬀect
on financial stability, but they abstracted from exactly how or what that eﬀect would be.
More research in this area is necessary in order to draw any conclusions. So far, there is
some limited evidence.
The assumption is that an aggregated higher credit level in the economy increases the risk
of financial instability, as described by Minsky and Kindleberger. Higher interest rates
will dampen the demand for credit and hence mitigate credit growth and systemic risk
directly. Also, as assumed in Woodford (2012), leverage in financial institutions might be
positively correlated with output. Higher interest rates that dampen economic activity
may then also reduce leverage levels in the financial sector and hence indirectly reduce
systemic risk. If one also acknowledges the existence of a "risk-taking" channel of mon-
etary policy, as described by Agur & Demertzis (2013), the case for directly including
monetary policy as a part of the solution for handling financial instability may appear
stronger.
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3.4.1 Consequences of the risk-taking channel
Agur & Demertzis (2013) have studied the impact on monetary policy if financial stability
is included as a factor in the monetary policy mandate. The diﬀerence between bank risk
taking and socially optimal risk is a factor in the monetary authority’s loss function,
together with the economy’s output gap. It is assumed that bank optimal risk taking
is larger than the social optimum, that bank risk is procyclical and that risk-taking is
persistent. They find that monetary policy may follow a more V-shaped path, compared
to what the traditional Taylor-rule would recommend. That is, rates would be cut deeper,
but for shorter periods during a downturn compared to a monetary policy regime without
a financial stability objective. On the other hand, during upswings rates would be raised
not just to limit output, but also to limit excess risk taking. This change of pattern is
due to the assumption of a risk-taking channel. If hit by a negative demand shock, rates
will be cut to get output back up. However, the policymaker is reluctant to keep rates
low for too long since that may induce the financial sector to take too much risk, once
the banking sector are done with their initial process of deleveraging. Therefore, rates
are cut deeper, but for a shorter time, for so to be raised to curb increased systemic risk
from the financial sector.
3.4.2 A longer horizon in Monetary Policy
However, one reason for why including financial stability explicitly into the central banks
mandate may be problematic is highlighted by an example in Adrian et al. (2013). "... pol-
icy makers would need to assess whether higher expected employment and higher downside
risk would be preferred to lower expected employment and lower downside risk."54 In the
Monetary Policy Report for July 2013, published by Sveriges Riksbank, this ponderation
is discussed in light of the, at the time, growing domestic household indebtedness. It is
argued that by lowering rates now the probability of a future crisis may increase. That, in
turn, implies downward pressure on inflation and economic activity, looking past the usual
medium term. It is stated that a monetary policy that takes account of financial stability
would face a trade-oﬀ: "A monetary policy that takes into account financial imbalances
[will face] a trade-oﬀ between attaining the target in the short and long term: inflation’s
deviations from 2 per cent and unemployment’s deviation from a normal level during the
normal three-year period are weighed against the expected course of development beyond
54page 39
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the forecast horizon."55
Authorizing an independent institution with making this tradeoﬀ is one challenge. Billi
& Vredin (2014) comments that even if a broader mandate in monetary policy may have
economic advantages, there is a potential for a lowered credibility of the price stabil-
ity objective and a general weaker support for independence of monetary policy. Another
challenge that will erupt if a broader mandate is given is addressed in theMonetary Policy
Report. How should the benefits in the short term be weighed against the consequential
buildup of risk in the longer term?
3.4.3 Leaning Monetary Policy versus Macroprudential Instruments
In their study, Lambertini, Mendicino & Punzi (2011) compare diﬀerent interest rate
rules and the use of a countercyclical macroprudential instrument. The instrument is
a time-varying Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio cap. The goal is to find the optimal policy
for mitigating boom-bust cycles. In their model, expectations create booms that distort
consumption and investments.The reversal of these expectations cause busts, which again
have negative eﬀects on economic and financial decisions. This may cause macroeconomic
losses. Hence, the model incorporates expectations-driven cycles. The model also distin-
guishes between savers and borrowers such that there can be done a comparison of welfare
outcomes between them. There are four important results that stand out from Lambertini
et al. (2011). First, when only comparing policy rate rules they find that a strict inflation
targeting policy rule is severely suboptimal to a more moderate policy rule. This is when
it comes to stabilizing housing prices and the loan-to-GDP ratio over time. Strict inflation
targeting is also detrimental to welfare, compared to a more moderate Taylor-type policy
rule. Second, the authors find that an interest rate rule that leans against credit growth
reduces booms and busts and is welfare improving, compared to the Taylor-type rule.
Third, they compare diﬀerent indicators for financial instability for the macroprudential
instrument to be adjusted in response to. To find the optimal indicator they compare
their eﬀectiveness in reducing the volatility in debt-to-GDP and the welfare of the two
types of agents in the economy. Lambertini et al. (2011) find that the only Pareto im-
provement, compared to the benchmark economy, is when they are using credit growth
as an indicator for the macroprudential instrument. An increase in credit growth thus
implies that borrowers face a tighter Loan-to-Value restriction. Lastly, They compare
55Monetary Policy Report, July 2013, page 48
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the outcome of using macroprudential policy with the outcome from using an interest rate
policy that targets the macroprudential goal of stabilizing credit growth. They find that
using the LTV-ratio cap is better with regard to stabilizing debt-to-GDP levels, house-
holds’ debt and inflation. However, the interest rate rule that targets financial variables
is more eﬀective in stabilizing investments, housing prices, consumption and GDP. When
it comes to the welfare criterion, it is not possible to do an unanimous ranking of the two
policy alternatives. This is due to the heterogeneity of agents in the model. Savers are
better oﬀ with the interest rate rule that responds to credit growth, since this alternative
to a larger extent stabilizes consumption. Borrowers, on the other hand are better oﬀ with
the macroprudential policy, because this alternative creates more stable credit conditions.
Kannan, Rabanal & Scott (2012) present a DSGE model with housing where shocks
in the financial sector and housing demand create boom-bust cycles. They construct four
diﬀerent policy rules for monetary and macroprudential policy. Then, they compare how
eﬃcient the diﬀerent rules are at stabilizing key variables in the economy, in response to
diﬀerent shocks. In their simulations Kannan et al. (2012) find that a monetary policy
that reacts with a tightened monetary policy in response to a positive financial shock
may be beneficial. A positive financial shock is in the model to be regarded as a positive
shock in credit growth, due to a lower mark-up from financial intermediaries. An interest
rule that responds to credit growth combined with a macroprudential instrument56 that
is also tightened in response to credit growth is even better, as the increase in the policy
rate then can be lower, since the instrument also mitigates credit growth. In response to
a positive financial shock, the interest rate and the macroprudential instrument comple-
ments each other such that overall volatility in GDP, inflation and consumption is lower
than in the case without the macroprudential instrument. Also, in response to a housing
demand shock does a leaning tactic in monetary policy lead to a welfare improvement.
Such a policy rule creates less volatility in key variables than what a policy rule only
responding to inflation and output gap would do. Adding a macroprudential instrument
to the leaning monetary policy does not change volatilities, and hence welfare, very much,
compared to the "leaning only" tactic. Whether welfare improves or not depends, as in
Lambertini et al, on the welfare criterion chosen. Using the macroprudential instrument
creates more stability in consumption, while leaving it out are better with respect to sta-
bility in lending rates (but then consumption will be more volatile).
56The macroprudential instrument can be regarded as additional capital requirements or additional
provisioning (Kannan et al. 2012).
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However, the simulations show that in response to a productivity shock, which carries
much of the same characterization as a housing demand shock, the use of the macro-
prudential instrument is not optimal. The macroprudential instrument puts downward
pressure on credit growth and creates a significant increase in lending rates. In turn, this
may give rise to considerable volatility in inflation and the output gap.
The general lesson from Kannan et al. (2012) is that it may be a good idea to give
the central bank extra tools to address financial shocks, since these tools could reduce
the need for aggressive monetary policy reactions. Hence, macroprudential policies may
create less disruptions in the macroeconomy. However, rigid reactions to indicators may
create policy mistakes, so judgement and the correct identification of the source of shocks
is crucial.
4 Woodford and Svensson and the Goals of Monetary
Policy
4.1 The Discussion
Inflation targeting, as now practiced, was intended to stabilize medium-term inflation
expectations. Well anchored inflation expectations would allow monetary policy to, more
aggressively, be used for stabilizing the real economy. If the price level is stable, due to the
well anchored expectations, changes in monetary policy to control output could be done
without any major sacrifice to price stability (Woodford 2012). According to Woodford,
the policy of inflation targeting was meant to handle two specific sources of macroeco-
nomic instability. The first being wage-price spirals, for example triggered by a shock in
commodity prices. In the western world, the shock in the price of oil in the 1970’s is an
example that stands out. If agents expect monetary policy to react upon higher prices,
there will be less pressure on wages and prices as a shock occur. Secondly, inflation tar-
geting was meant to reduce the risk of self-fulfilling deflation, in the period following a
crash. This was observed following the Great Depression in the 1930’s. It is well known
that a general belief of deflation itself can cause deflation, as saving is perceived to be
profitable at the expense of spending. More specific, a drop in demand due to a belief
that the value of money will increase leads to a drop in prices. A drop in prices confirms
the ex-ante beliefs, and the dynamic continues. Well anchored inflation expectations will
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prevent this dynamic, because agents know monetary policy will do whatever it takes to
prevent deflation from happening. Woodford comments that, in this light, the regime
of inflation targeting has functioned quite well. Following the recent crisis, which some
have compared to the Great Depression, no economy has ended up in a deflationary spiral
(yet). Also, even though we have seen massive volatility in the price of oil and other
commodities, this has not caused any wage-price spirals of the same magnitude as in the
1970’s.
However, Woodford asks, could an alternative monetary policy have prevented the re-
cent crisis altogether? He is not alone in raising this question. In Leijonhufvud (2008)
for example, it is commented that an important cause for the crisis itself was the failure
of monetary policy in the US preceding the crash. Specific macroeconomical conditions,
like import competition and exchange rate policy by the countries of origin of that import
caused low inflation in the US in the years preceding the crisis. Monetary authorities
in the US interpreted the low inflation as a confirmation of their low-interest rate policy
being "right", following the dot.com bubble. However, the low rates may have caused very
favorable conditions for bubbles to build up. According to Leijonhufvud (2008), monetary
policy in the US was far to easy in the years preceding the crisis.
Lars Svensson57, a known theorist of inflation targeting, does not agree with Leijon-
hufvud. In Svensson (2011) he states quite clearly that "Easy monetary policy in the
United States did not cause the crisis."58 In Svenssons view, it was the supervisory and
regulatory failures as well as the house-financing policy in the US in combination with
global imbalances that caused the massive imbalances which eventually caused the crisis.
He further states that in his view flexible inflation targeting conducted in the right way,
using all available information relevant for forecasting inflation and resource utilization
including the conduct of financial stability policy, remains as the optimal monetary pol-
icy. Woodford, on the other hand, believes the crisis does justify a reconsideration of the
doctrine of inflation targeting, specifically the notion that monetary policy is not to take
into account the development in the financial sector. That is, the notion that monetary
policy should take into account financial stability only insofar as it aﬀects the outlook of
inflation or real activity. Is such a view defensible, looking back at the experience of the
57Lars Svensson is a Swedish economist and a professor at Princeton University. He has also held the
position as deputy governor at the Sveriges Riksbank (2007-2013).
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recent crisis? (Woodford 2012). Further, he asks, would an incorporation of financial de-
velopments in monetary policy require an abandonment of inflation targeting altogether?
In Svensson (2012), the author argues that suggestions regarding an incorporation of fi-
nancial stability into monetary policy is inappropriate. In his view, there are better and
more eﬃcient ways of addressing financial instability. He illustrates this, by adding a
macroprudential instrument to the model in Woodford (2012).
Before presenting the model in Woodford (2012), for how an implementation of finan-
cial stability can be incorporated with the traditional inflation targeting, Woodford goes
through some of the arguments that have been posed to set aside the question of financial
stability in the conduct of monetary policy. Next, I will present these arguments and
include Svenssons views where they conflict with Woodford.
Claim: Financial crisis’ are not predictable enough for it to be any gains by
adopting a "leaning against the wind" policy with regard to disruptions in the
financial sector.
Svensson (2011) argues that it is too diﬃcult to, in real time, distinguish what is an
unsustainable situation, and hence, when to take action. There are costs, measured in
output, associated with an increase in the policy rate. As it is diﬃcult to detect when to
take action, untimely policy responses to financial developments are likely to happen.
Looking at the alternative policy, "mopping up" after the crash, the recent crisis, even
with its strong and unconventional policy responses, have not been able to hinder a sharp
contraction in world trade and economic activity. So, one argument is that though it
carries costs to use the policy rate in response to financial imbalances, it may certainly be
costly not to (Woodford 2012). This is also emphasized in Hahm et al. (2012). Besides the
obvious cost of a massive drop in output following a financial crisis, Hahm et al. lists three
additional factors that might create long lasting costs on the economy. Firstly, financial
crisis are usually followed by a prolonged period of slow growth, because the deleverag-
ing process takes time. Secondly, the budgetary position of governments’ deteriorates, as
fiscal stimulus and bailouts coincides with a lower tax revenue. Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Italy and Ireland are European examples of this eﬀect following the recent crisis. This
could potentially lead to a sovereign debt crisis, and eventually even sovereign defaults.
Lastly, the central banks’ nonconventional monetary policy may be diﬃcult to exit from
without also hindering the ability of the central bank to successfully manage the economy
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in the future. Asset and securities purchases by central banks are crossing into the area
of fiscal policy. This may lead to increased political criticism and questions could arise
regarding the independence of central banks. The consequence could be that politicians
limit the possibility for future nonconventional monetary policy (Hahm et al. 2012).
Woodford also argues that the claim is misleading as monetary policy, in his framework,
is not meant to react upon the knowledge that a crisis will occur, but rather based on the
identification of circumstances which will increase the probability of a financial crisis. He
explains that it is not the case that central banks are to monitor and act upon what they
perceive as over-valued assets. The criticism based on this notion, arguing that there is no
reason to believe that the central bank should be better at forecasting asset price swings
than other agents in the economy are correct, but miss at the target. The goal for the
central bank is rather to detect extreme levels of maturity transformation and leverage
in the financial sector, and act upon this. There are, as mentioned earlier in the thesis,
many suggested indicators to measure systemic risk. One of the indicators regarded as
most useful, is the credit-to-GDP gap. Woodford refers to Borio and Drehmann (2009)
who finds that strong increases in credit and asset prices proves to have predictive value
on banking crisis. Other references are Drehmann & Tsatsaronis (2014) and Schularick &
Taylor (2012). However, there are also authors skeptical of the usefulness of the credit-
to-GDP and other empirical measures of financial stability (e.g. Leeper & Nason (2014)
and Edge & Meisenzahl (2011)) Both the technical reliability of such measures (Edge &
Meisenzahl 2011) and the potential diﬃculty of separating unstable developments in the
financial sector from natural developments in the economy (Leeper & Nason 2014) has
been addressed.
Claim: Even if it is possible to detect a sharp increase in systemic risk, mon-
etary policy will have limited influence on the build-up of risk in the financial
sector.
Svensson comments that for the policy rate to have a noticeable impact on credit growth
and house prices, the change in the policy rate will have to be considerable. This may
have strong negative eﬀects on resource utilization and inflation, also in sectors that is
not experiencing any speculative activity (Svensson 2011).
Here, as with the former claim, Woodford argues that the argument is misplaced. What
the central bank is to consider is excessive leverage in the system as a whole and extreme
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levels of maturity mismatch in financial institutions. Addressing these issues, Woodford
(2012) notes that even small changes in the short term interest rate may have an eﬀect.
Firms incentive to seek high degrees of leverage and borrow in the short term wholesale
funding market may change considerably by even modest changes in the short term inter-
est rate. This, in turn, can mitigate systemic risk, argues Woodford. He states that there
is no ground to assert that interest rate policy is irrelevant to financial stability. This is
in line with the theory of the "risk-taking" channel of monetary policy.59
Claim: Even given that monetary policy can influence the risk of a finan-
cial crisis, there are better policy tools to address the problem.
Svensson argues that by introducing macroprudential instruments, e.g. a countercyclical
capital requirement on credit institutions, excessive leverage in the economy can be ad-
dressed more directly than if using the policy rate.
However, as noted in my chapter on countercyclical capital requirements, referring to
González-Páramo (2012), macroprudential instruments such as countercyclical capital
requirements may be vulnerable to leakages and arbitrage. Thus, even though macro-
prudential instruments might be more targeted in addressing excessive leverage in the
economy, there are ways for financial institutions to circumvent the regulations. Mone-
tary policy on the other hand, via the policy rate targets all financial intermediators in the
economy, also the "shadow banking" system. Adjustments in the policy rate aﬀects the
cost of borrowing for all borrowers, including those who circumvents the macroprudential
instruments (Spencer 2014).
On the other hand, the fact that it targets so widely is also used as an argument against
using the policy rate to maintain financial stability. In Svensson (2011) it is commented
that "the interest rate is a blunt and unsuitable instrument for aﬀecting financial stabil-
ity."60 This is in line with Claessens & Habermeier (2013), who note that it is usually such
that financial distortions are more acute in a few sectors, rather than in the economy as
a whole. Thus, increasing the policy rate to control financial imbalances in a few sectors
may be done at the expense of sound investments in other sectors. Due to this, Svensson
claims it makes "little sense" to assign the objective of sustaining financial stability to
monetary policy. He notes in Svensson (2012), "Monetary policy should be the last line
59See section 3.2
60Page 4-5
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of defense of financial stability, not the first line".
Woodford does not reject the contribution other policy tools may have on maintain-
ing financial stability. He comments that acknowledging that monetary policy is relevant
to financial stability is no excuse for not improving bank-regulation and implementing
macroprudential tools such as capital requirements. However, he comments that as long
as macroprudential policy can not guarantee that there never will be any situations of
financial instability, monetary policy will have to be a part of the solution. Hence, until
it is clear that new tools and regulations have completely solved the problem of financial
instability, Woodford argues that central banks should incorporate in their policy deci-
sions how their actions aﬀect the financial system (Woodford 2012).
Claim: There will be a conflict between the use of monetary policy to control
risks to financial stability, and the use of it to maintain price stability and
stable real activity.
Woodford agrees that there might be situations where the objectives demand conflict-
ing policy measures, if financial stability is incorporated in monetary policy. However,
he comments that there already is a tension in the standard inflation targeting policy.
That is the tension between maintaing medium term inflation and stable output growth.
This is well known and also acknowledged by the theorists of inflation targeting, such as
Mervyn King, Ben Bernanke and Lars Svensson. The theory suggests it should be possible
to use the short term key policy rate to mitigate short run instability of the output gap
at the expense of the optimal policy for maintaining medium run inflation expectations.
From the theory, it is well known that when the economy is hit by a positive "cost-push"
shock, with the consequences of increased inflation and a drop in economic activity, op-
timal policy will not be a severe tightening of monetary policy, so that inflation returns
to target as soon as possible. If some weight also are attached to keeping output close to
its projected trend estimate, it is optimal to balance the two goals when adjusting policy.
Woodford argues, and shows in his model, that financial stability should take a similar
role in the traditional inflation targeting monetary policy as the output gap now has. He
believes it is appropriate to introduce a new "flexible inflation targeting", where central
banks should balance the objective of financial stability against the objectives of price
stability and stability in output.
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4.2 Woodfords Model
In Woodford (2012), it is presented a New Keynesian DSGE model, which is a simplified
version of the model in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009). The key variable of the model is
⌦t which, at any time, is the gap between the marginal utilities of income of two diﬀerent
types of households.61 The households diﬀer in the way that some are credit-constrained,
while others are not. An increase in ⌦t represents an increase in the gap of marginal
utility of borrowers, compared to that of savers. This means that, to a greater extent,
spending by borrowers is ineﬃciently low. Hence, it can be thought of as a variable that
measures the distortion of expenditure, due to credit frictions. The IS equation takes the
following form
yt   gt +  ⌦t = Et[yt+1   gt+1 +  ⌦t+1]   [it   Et⇡t+1],  ,  > 0 (1)
Here yt measures the output gap, gt is a composite of various exogenous variables that
shifts the relation between aggregate expenditure and marginal utility of income. One
example is government purchases. it is the short term interest rate and ⇡t+1 is the infla-
tion rate from t to t+1. From this setup we observe that real aggregate demand not only
depends on the expected real interest rate and government purchases, but also on the
degree of credit frictions. Woodford refers to an increase in ⌦t as to what is sometimes
called "financial headwinds".
The model’s aggregate supply relation is also modified to include the state of the financial
sector. It takes the form
⇡t = {yyt + {⌦⌦t +  Et⇡t+1 + ut, {y,{⌦ > 0 and 0    < 1 (2)
Here, ut is composite representing various exogenous "cost-push" shocks. There is a pos-
itive relation between the degree of credit frictions and inflation. Since a higher value of
⌦t eﬀects real expenditure through restrictions on credit and by that an increase in the
marginal utility of income, an increase in ⌦t for a given real expenditure, only corresponds
to a decrease in the average marginal utility of income. A lower, on average, marginal
utility of income creates upward pressure on wages, and hence inflation. In the model
there are two states of ⌦. It can either take a low value (the "normal" state), ⌦, or a high
value ("crisis" state), ⌦. Woodford assumes that the probability of a transition from a
normal to the crisis state is endogenous, and represented by  t, which is assumed to vary
61Could also be considered as the spread in interest rates between borrowers and savers.
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with the degree of leverage in the financial sector of the economy. So,  t =  t(Lt), where
the function has the properties
 t(Lt),  0t(Lt),  00t (Lt) > 0
The idea behind these assumptions is that the higher the leverage rate in financial institu-
tions, the less of an unexpected fall in asset values are needed for a change of state (from
normal to crisis). In essence, higher leverage requires a smaller exogenous shock to trigger
a crisis. Woodford comments that it is not just the degree of leverage that determines the
probability of a change of state. The degree of maturity and liquidity mismatch between
institutions’ assets and liabilities are also crucial. In the model, however, these factors
are also embedded in the function representing leverage. The law of motion for leverage
(or financial risk-taking) is endogenous, and represented by
Lt = %Lt 1 + ⇠yt + vt 0 < % < 1, ⇠ > 0 (3)
An increase in aggregate expenditure is assumed to have a positive relation with aggre-
gate borrowing. As expenditure increases, borrowers expenditure also increases and it
is assumed that borrowers expenditure increases by more than their increase in income.
Hence, aggregate borrowing rises. vt represents a variety of factors. Generally it rep-
resents a change in the degree of risk the institutions must take to finance their assets.
A positive value of vt could for instance represent an event that reduces banks’ capital
values. By including the objective of reducing the probability of a financial crisis, into
the mandate of monetary policy, Woodford describes the loss-function the central bank
is to minimize as
1
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 t[⇡2t +  yy
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t +  ⌦⌦
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t ]  y,  ⌦ > 0 and 0 <   < 1 (4)
In Woodford (2012), it is first shown what the optimal target criterion62 would be, if  t is
independent of leverage. In that case, changes in the state of the financial sector would
be purely exogenous, and ⌦t will not be a part of the loss function. Woodford finds that
the criterion then is
⇡t +  y(yt   yt 1) = 0 (5)
62Compliance to the target criterion ensures an optimal evolution of output and inflation. It is optimal
as this relation between inflation and the output gap minimizes the loss function each period, contingent
on the state of the economy. Technically, the target criterion is the first order condition that must hold
for policy to be optimal.
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in every period t   1,where  y ⌘  y{y . This is the standard target criterion for a simple New
Keynesian model. Alternatively, the first-order condition can be expressed as a constant
price level target,
pt +  yyt = p
⇤ (6)
So, if the change of state is purely exogenous, optimal policy is to balance price and
output levels. However, policy must still take take the financial sector into consideration,
because financial imbalances has a direct impact on output, as the mentioned "financial
headwinds" in (1).
However, if  t does depend on leverage, as in (3), the solution becomes a bit more intri-
cate. Now, ⌦t appears in the loss function. Woodford defines Xt as the "marginal crisis
risk", and this factor is now one that monetary authorities must consider, additional to
inflation and the output gap when they set the policy interest rate. Xt is a measure of
the rate of increase in expected loss, when leverage increases by one unit.
Xt ⌘  0t(Lt)⇥ Vt+1|t (7)
This is the value of Xt for ⌦t = ⌦, while Xt = 0, if the economy is in a crisis
(⌦ = ⌦). Vt+1 is a function that represents the minimum attainable loss for the policy-
maker, looking from period t+1 and onwards.  Vt+1|t is defined as
 Vt+1|t ⌘ E[Vt+1 | ht,⌦t+1 = ⌦]  E[Vt+1 | ht,⌦t+1 = ⌦] (8)
and gives the impact a crisis, in t+1, will have on value of the policymakers forward-
looking loss function. ht is the state of the world, known in t. Woodford finds the
following criterion to describe optimal policy
pt +  yyt +  xEt
1X
T=t
( %)T tEtXT = p⇤ (9)
Woodford shows that this equation, and conformity to it, is a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for optimally policy commitment, under the assumption of an endogenous de-
velopment in the probability of a financial crisis. The last term on the left-hand side of
(9), the "marginal crisis risk", can not be negative. Hence, this rule implies that monetary
authorities must let output and/or the price level undershoot values that normally would
be regarded as appropriate when the financial risk is high. Thus, the model in Woodford
(2012) recommends a "leaning against" a credit boom policy, even if that implies that
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both output and inflation are below medium-run targets. Additionally, commitment to a
price level target implies that periods of "leaning" against financial developments, which
in turn may cause a fall in prices, will have to be followed by a period of high inflation to
get prices back up when the financial sector no longer poses a high risk.
The disruptions in the financial intermediation observed in 2007-09 makes Woodford con-
clude that the inflation targeting framework needs to be reformed, and take into account
the probability of financial crisis when conducting monetary policy. However, there is
not necessarily a need for substantial changes in the already existing framework. Central
banks and monetary policy are still to commit to preserve medium term price-stability.
What he suggests should be changed, however, is the goal of preserving inflation-rates.
Rather, monetary policy should focus on the cumulative ex-post realized increase in the
price level, as a metric for price stability. In essence, Woodford suggests a transition from
the focus on medium term inflation rates, to the medium term change in the price-level.
Also, the focus on the horizon for when inflation are to return to target, should, according
to Woodford, be replaced by a criteria for how large of a temporary deviation from price
stability one can justify.
The risk of the zero lower bound and the possibility of using monetary policy to mit-
igate the risk of financial crisis justifies a re-thinking and evaluation of the traditional
inflation targeting regime. Woodford comments that his proposition is an extension of,
rather than an alternative to the inflation targeting regime that now are being followed
by central banks.
4.3 Svenssons alternative
The fundamental disagreement between Svensson and Woodford is whether financial sta-
bility should be an objective of monetary policy or not. According to Svensson, monetary
and financial stability policy are distinct and diﬀerent, as monetary policy is the domain
of the central banks while the responsibility of financial stability, in most countries, are
shared between several institutions. He comments that monetary policy used for miti-
gating imbalances in the financial sector are bound to create confusion and ineﬃciency.
Since the two policies have diﬀerent objectives and diﬀerent instruments to reach these
objectives, they need to be conceptually distinguished from each other (Svensson 2011).
The reasoning behind this view is that if monetary and financial stability policy are not
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distinguished from each other, it will lead to both practical and conceptual confusion in
policymaking. In turn, this may undermine the eﬃciency of policy as well as the policy
institutions’ credibility.
In response to Woodford proposition, Svensson (2012) introduces a macroprudential in-
strument in Woodfords model to show how financial stability may be obtained without
altering the traditional monetary policy objectives of stable output growth and price
stability. In this way, monetary policy and financial stability policy can be conducted
separately, and thus, the conceptual and practical confusion that may occur, if financial
stability is implemented as an objective in monetary policy, is avoided. Svensson intro-
duces a macroprudential instrument, ft in equation (3), which he argues could be regarded
as cyclical capital requirements, like a countercyclical capital buﬀer.
Lt = %Lt 1 + ⇠yt + ft + vt 0 < % < 1, ⇠ > 0 (3a)
He comments that this will separate financial stability from monetary policy, whereafter
the social loss function can be separated into two:
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The first part of the social loss function may be assigned to monetary policy, and min-
imized by the use of the policy rate, it. The second part of the loss function may be
assigned to financial stability policy, and minimized with the use of the instrument ft. If
the level of leverage in financial institutions can be controlled by the instrument, there is
no longer a need for interest rate policy to step in to contract output in response to a rise
in the risk of a crisis, an increase in  t(Lt).
Like Woodford, Svensson assumes that there exists a level, L, such that for levels of
leverage beneath that value, the risk of a financial crisis is negligible. Svensson goes a bit
further and assumes that for Lt  L,  t is independent of leverage. That is
 t =   for Lt  L,  0t(Lt),  00t (Lt) > 0 for Lt > L.
It is now clear that optimal macroprudential policy will be to make sure leverage is equal
to or less than the critical value, L. The optimal use of the macroprudential instrument
is to adjust it every period, such that
ft  f(yt, vt, Lt 1) ⌘ L  %Lt 1   ⇠yt   vt (10)
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An elevated risk of a financial crisis, due to an increased degree of leverage in financial
institutions, will be neutralized if the macroprudential instrument is adjusted according
to this rule. The capital requirements on institutions will be tightened in response to an
increase in the output gap, if a negative shock to the institutions’ capital occur and in
response to lagged leverage. It is important to note that through the eﬀect of monetary
policy on the output gap, macroprudential policy needs to take monetary policy into
account when making the adjustments.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
The discussion between Svensson and Woodford in Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review
(Nr 1, 2012) covers many of the topics reviewed in this thesis. I will, in the next section,
revisit some of the issues they discussed. First, it is important to clarify the views of
Woodford and Svensson so as to define the basis for the following discussion. As I see
it, they both represent the view that some form of time-varying leaning in policy is an
appropriate safeguard mechanism against systemic risk. However, the main diﬀerence
between their positions is how they view the role of monetary policy. Svensson argues
that monetary policy should remain focused on its traditional objectives, i.e. ensuring
full employment and maintaining price stability, while macroprudential policy should be
given the task of maintaining financial stability. Woodford, on the other hand, while not
rejecting the contribution from alternative time-varying policy instruments, argues that
monetary policy also should have a role in handling financial imbalances.
5.1 Measuring Systemic Risk
As described in the section Financial Stability and Systemic Risk above, a high leverage
ratio in financial institutions may imply that a small shock could be enough to create
situations of fire-sales on assets. This may, in turn, cause widespread bank defaults with
major consequences for the real economy. Both Woodford and Svensson use the aggregate
level of leverage in the financial sector as their indicator for systemic risk. Though it is
generally believed that a high degree of leverage in the banking sector increases risk, this
general measure has some limitations. Both Adrian et al. (2013) and Galati & Moessner
(2013) comment that this kind63 of measure for systemic risk, are lagging in time. Hence,
they believe leverage as an indicator for risk will react too late to the fact that systemic
63Adrian et al. use the term standard measures, Galati and Moessner balance sheet indicators.
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risk is rising. If so, policy actions might not be optimally timed and policy mistakes may
occur.
Another issue arising from Woodford and Svenssons use of leverage as an indicator for
systemic risk is that it is not particularly well specified. In general, the leverage ratio of an
institution is defined as the ratio of its total assets to its core capital (Tier 1) (or equity).
However, the value of this indicator may diﬀer considerably depending on whether the
assets are weighted by risk or not.
If assets are not weighted by risk, the leverage ratio being used to calculate the prob-
ability of a financial crisis in the policy rule may at times be misleading. As noted by The
Economist, the result is that "toxic junk [will be] treated the same as Treasury bonds"64.
In Woodford (2012), monetary policy responds to a higher aggregate level of leverage
with an increase in the policy rate. A higher interest rate is meant to lower the out-
put gap which in turn will lower the demand for credit and consequently the aggregate
leverage level. It may be argued that the cost of this, i.e. lowering output, might not
be justified if the financial institutions, for the most part, are exposed to safe assets (e.g.
Treasury bonds).
It may, to get a better picture of the true risk at diﬀerent levels of leverage, be bet-
ter to weigh the financial institutions’ assets based on their risk. However, establishing
the correct risk weights for this purpose will be diﬃcult. Interest rate policy conducted
on the basis of subjective evaluations of risk may therefore be politically challenging.
5.2 The eﬀectiveness of the instruments addressing systemic risk
Svensson argues that a countercyclical capital requirement on financial institutions or
other macroprudential tools may be eﬀective in controlling leverage in the financial sys-
tem. The empirical results in Lim et al. (2011) do, in some ways, support this claim.
In their study they find that countercyclical capital requirements do have a significant
eﬀect in mitigating the procyclicality in leverage growth65. In the model presented by
Woodford and Svensson that would imply that the introduction of countercyclical capital
requirements will reduce the value of ⇠. Lim et al. (2011) do, however, not investigate
64The Economist, Volume 413 (22-28 Nov, 2014 ), pp 65-66
65In the study measured as the growth in assets over capital in financial institutions.
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how countercyclical capital requirements aﬀect the level of leverage in financial institu-
tions. Because Svensson, in his model, assumes that countercyclical capital requirements
will directly aﬀect leverage, the result in Lim et al. on the eﬀect of capital requirements
on the procyclicality of leverage can not be used neither to discard nor to support that
assumption.
Lim et al. (2011) try, in the same study, to establish how eﬀective diﬀerent instruments
are at reducing the procyclicality of total credit growth66. As discussed earlier, a high
level of credit may make an economy more vulnerable to shocks. Some even suggest that
high credit levels in itself can cause financial crisis (Schularick & Taylor 2012). Lim et al.
(2011) find no evidence to support the claim that countercyclical capital requirements
have any aﬀect on mitigating the procyclicality of credit growth.
Thus, countercyclical capital requirements may be a meaningful instrument to mitigate
the procyclicality in leverage growth. However, as empirical studies show, there are other
threats to financial stability not addressed by this instrument. If these other threats are to
be addressed within Svenssons framework, additional tools may have to be implemented.
In that case the coordination and combination of those tools may present a challenge.
With regard to Woodfords framework, his "marginal crisis risk" indicator may be broad-
ened to include credit growth. Even though it may not change the conduct of policy
very much, communication challenges may arise as more indicators for the interest rate
to respond to are introduced. As an example, credit growth may challenge the trust in
the central banks’ commitment to deliver price stability.
5.3 Adverse eﬀects of the instrument
As noted by Woodford, including financial stability as an objective in monetary policy is
controversial. The fear among many is that an increase in the policy rate in response to
increased systemic risk may tip the economy into a deflationary spiral. This may happen
if inflation and output are on or below their target values, while the indicator for risk is
high. If deflation grips, reducing interest rates might not be enough to restore stability
or growth in prices, as the public no longer expects stable or growing prices. Persistent
66In the study measured as the log change in real credit. Credit is measured as total claims on the
private sector.
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deflation and economic depression may follow. Considering how costly and disruptive
a period of prolonged deflation may be, the danger of deflation is a relevant argument
against an adoption of a leaning against financial risk in monetary policy.
Woodford does address the danger of deflation and claims that with his interest rate
rule, that leans against leverage, that danger may be reduced if monetary policy targets a
price level rather than price growth. The reason is simple, as deflation prevails, prices will
drift further away from the monetary authority’s committed price level. In turn this will
create expectations of above average inflation in order to get back to target. Woodford
further comments that this change in expectations about future price growth may not
occur if the monetary authority targets inflation. The reason is that they, in such event,
will not allow excess price growth (above the target) in order to get the price level back
up, not even to oﬀset the past deflation. In this way, a price-level target brings more trust
than an inflation target. More trust in the monetary authority’s commitment to comply
with its expressed target creates a profit. With a high degree of trust by the general
public in the monetary authority’s commitment to reach its goals, less adjustments in the
policy rate may be needed to mitigate volatility in the price level. It follows that the risk
of monetary policy of becoming constrained by the zero lower bound on the interest rate
may be smaller.
Woodford may be right in his reasoning that the ex-post commitment to reach a cer-
tain price level might be easier for the public to understand and trust. Since expectations
about decreasing prices is an important reason for deflation, targeting levels rather than
growth in prices could therefore reduce the danger of deflation.
An aggressive response to financial developments through macroprudential policy ini-
tiatives may also increase the probability of tipping the economy into deflation. This is
because macroprudential policy could impose a constraint on monetary policy. As dis-
cussed in the chapter The overlapping eﬀect above, this may take the form of a tightening
of macroprudential policy which will place direct pressure on inflation and economic ac-
tivity67 or by weakening the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.68
67The LEI- and MAG-study found that countercyclical capital requirements could have medium term
negative eﬀects on output
68González-Páramo (2012), Cecchetti & Kohler (2014) and Billi & Vredin (2014)
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If tightened capital requirements cause a fall in the supply of credit and a subsequent
decrease in economic activity and inflation, a drop in the policy rate may not have the
intended eﬀect of increasing economic activity and inflation. Rather, the financial insti-
tutions may be forced to maintain the interest rate faced by borrowers at a high level
to comply with the increased capital requirements. In the model presented by Svensson
and Woodford this would imply that the interest rate faced by borrowers (iLt ), may be a
function of the policy rate (iMPt ) and the macroprudential instrument (ft), such that;
iLt = i
L
t (i
MP
t , ft)
Where iLt ’1 > 0 and iLt ’2 < 0. The lending rate will increase when the macroprudential
policy instrument is tightened. (It follows from equation (10) that a tightening of the
capital requirements implies a reduction in ft)
This could potentially tip the economy into a deflationary spiral because monetary pol-
icy may have reached the zero lower bound on the interest rate as financial institutions
were leveraging down. Though, the countercyclical capital requirement would be reduced
and perhaps even removed in full before deflation settled. In turn, that may have in-
creased credit availability and hence activity whereafter price growth will have turned
positive. Nonetheless, these mechanisms of overlapping and potentially conflicting eﬀects
of macroprudential and monetary policy needs to be understood and accounted for when
policymakers are considering how to optimally address financial instability.
5.4 Coordination
The general opinion in the current literature is that there may be potential gains from co-
ordinating macroprudential and monetary policy. The reason is that most empirical and
theoretical results suggest that monetary and macroprudential policy instruments aﬀect
either the other policy’s goals directly or have an impact on the eﬃciency of the other
policy’s instruments. Most important is the overlapping eﬀects monetary and macropru-
dential policy may have on the credit market. Specifically, one of the channels where an
adjustment in the key policy rate may eﬀect the economy is through changes in the price
and supply of credit. In turn, this aﬀects the level of investment and total output. Some
macroprudential policies do also have an impact on the total credit level. Depending
on the instrument, they may dampen credit levels by restricting access to credit (LTV-
and DTI-ratio caps and restrictions on foreign currency borrowing), reduce the supply of
credit (capital requirements, reserve requirements, dynamic provisioning) or by increasing
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the cost of credit (capital requirements and debt-taxes).
There is diﬀering opinions on how and to what extent monetary and financial stabil-
ity policy should be coordinated. As I see it, the diﬀerent views can broadly be divided
into three areas. The first category is where monetary and financial stability policy share
the social loss function and both instruments, the policy rate and the macroprudential
tool, are chosen in conjunction to minimize that function. The second category is where
the social loss function is divided into two and financial stability and monetary policy is
conducted separately. However, policy is conducted taking the other policy into account
as in a Nash equilibrium. The third category does also constitute a separation of the loss
function and hence mandates. Though, in diﬀerence from the second category, policy is
conducted without taking the other policy into account when choosing the response to
changing economic conditions.
Woodford supports the notion that financial stability and monetary policy should be
determined in conjunction. As shown in equation (4) in section 4.2, that implies a social
loss function consisting of the traditional monetary policy variables, as well as a vari-
able describing the state of the financial sector. Macroprudential policy is not explicitly
included in Woodfords model. However, he comments that a macroprudential instru-
ment, e.g. countercyclical capital requirements, could be included in the model. In his
setup of joint optimization of policy, optimal policy would involve adjustments in both
instruments in response to changing economic conditions. Woodfords’ main argument in
favor of full coordination of policy is that macroprudential policy has not yet proven to
be capable of providing a complete solution to the challenge of achieving and maintaing
financial stability. Hence, monetary policy has a part to play in maintaining this objective.
Another reason for why a shared loss function between monetary and financial stability
policy could be beneficial rests on the assumption discussed in section 5.3. If monetary
policy were to reach the zero lower bound on the interest rate and thus not be able to
reach the goals for monetary policy, macroprudential policy may be used to increase price
growth and economic activity. This may not happen if the mandates for financial stability
and monetary policy is divided, as macroprudential policy then only is concerned with
financial variables.
Svensson argues against a shared loss function for monetary policy that includes finan-
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cial stability. I have repeatedly mentioned Svenssons statement regarding monetary and
macroprudential policy as being distinct and diﬀerent from each other. Svensson notes
that his argument also applies with regard to the coordination of policy. In Svenssons
view, monetary policy should be conducted taking macroprudential policy into account,
and vice versa, as in a Nash equilibrium, rather than in a coordinated equilibrium. Hence,
Svensson is an advocate for the second category as to how to organize monetary and fi-
nancial stability policy. It should be organized this way, regardless of whether the central
bank has the sole authority of the two policies, or if the responsibilities are shared between
diﬀerent institutions. Using monetary policy as a first line of defense to achieve and main-
tain financial stability is, according to Svensson, a second-best option. Macroprudential
policy, applied in the right way should be given this task. Svenssons further argues that
by not strictly dividing responsibilities and conduct of monetary and macroprudential
policy, there is a risk that monetary and macroprudential policy may be confused with
each other. In turn, this may lead to poorer outcomes for both policies and make it
diﬃcult to hold the diﬀerent policymakers accountable.
This last point, regarding accountability, is also discussed by other authors. Billi &
Vredin (2014) comments that the high degree of independence granted to many central
banks might be put under pressure if financial stability policies where to become a part
of the monetary policy mandate. In Billi and Vredin this is discussed in light of the
notion that monetary policy are to "lean against the wind" with regard to the financial
sector. This is not Svenssons point, as his comment is made with regard to coordination
of the policy areas, rather than giving monetary policy the task of responding to financial
developments. However, I believe the potential threat to central banks’ independence
if macroprudential policy is coordinated with monetary policy still is a valid argument
against a full coordination of these.
Bryant et al. (2012) support the view that some form of coordination between macro-
prudential and monetary policy could have welfare gains and that decentralized decision
making without coordination may cause ineﬃciencies. I believe that it needs to be pointed
out again that the reason why many models discussed in this thesis do recommend coor-
dinated responses by monetary and macroprudential policy is because these models are
assuming that macroprudential policy aﬀects the goal variables of monetary policy. In
that way macroprudential policy overlaps with monetary policy. If that were not to be
true, or only hold to a very limited extent, a full coordination of policies, as implied by
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Woodford might not give large welfare gains. Rather, an organization of the third cat-
egory may be optimal. Completely decentralized policy authorities with no information
sharing who do not take each others policy responses into account may increase account-
ability. Additionally, as commented by Bryant et al. (2012), this type of organization of
macroprudential and monetary policy gives little reason to fear an undue concentration
of power in the central bank (which could threaten its independence), and may create a
specialization of functions in both policy authorities/institutions.
There is a variety of macroprudential policies and they operate through many diﬀer-
ent channels. Todays knowledge about their impact on the wider economy is limited. It
follows from this that it is diﬃcult to make any general assessments about the extent to
which policy should be coordinated. The term "macroprudential" must be concretized
and we need more empirical results on the degree of overlapping the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
instruments have with monetary policy, before we can reach any conclusions regarding
how to optimally coordinate monetary and macroprudential policy.
However, if I were to comment on Svensson and Woodfords suggestions, I believe the
notion that Svensson advocates in his extension of Woodfords model may be too simplis-
tic. As available empirical and theoretical research show, there is good reason to believe
that many macroprudential instruments, to at least some extent, aﬀect economic activity
and inflation through the cycle, via borrowing rates or access to credit. Because this may
create situations were monetary policy reaches the zero lower bound on the interest rate,
I believe some form of coordination of policy will be a necessity to reduce economic and
financial instability.
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6 Terms
There is a wide range of terms and concepts in the literature concerning macroprudential
policy. In the following I will present a few chosen terms I believe needs further explana-
tion.
A pecuniary externality is an externality that works through prices, when prices aﬀect
constraints in the economy. According to Holcombe & Sobel (2001) they occur when the
action of one agent, for example by selling an asset, reduces the value of similar assets
held by other agents. Price changes are not themselves a source of ineﬃciency. But when
for example housing is used as collateral and the eﬀect on collateral constraints of house
price changes are not internalized when agents trade, a pecuniary externality is said to
be present.
The "Value at Risk (VaR)" is a common measure of risk used by financial institutions.
It is an estimate of the maximum potential numerical loss (e.g dollar) within a certain
significance level for an individual institution in isolation (Adrian & Brunnermeier 2011).
A VaR analysis also depends on the time frame, so the VaR analysis is meant to answer
what the maximum potential loss could be, within a certain time frame, for diﬀerent
degrees of confidence. Adrian & Brunnermeier (2011) defines the "Conditional Value
at Risk (CoVaR)" of an institution as the value at risk for the whole financial system
if that institution is experiencing distress. The diﬀerence between the estimated CoVaR
when the institution is under distress and the estimate for when it is in its "normal"
state is the " CoVaR", and captures the marginal contribution to systemic risk, of that
institution. Intuitively one might think that an institutions VaR and CoVaR gives the
same outcome. Empirically that is not the case though (Adrian & Brunnermeier 2011).
In a highly interconnected financial system, one company’s distress can cause distress on
other institutions and thereby cause higher total losses to the system than just the loss
from the initial institution. If this is the case, the CoVaR will be higher than the VaR for
that company.
The purpose of a "macro stress-test" is to measure and trace the response of the
financial system if hit by a large exogenous shock. This may indicate how vulnerable the
financial system is, and thereby be an indicator for policy actions. Using a macroecono-
metric model, one maps the consequences of an initial shock through multiple stages, often
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including "satellite" models to include financial sector variables. The following example
is from Foglia (2009), and gives a good insight into how a macro stress-test is conducted.
1. A simulated stress-event occur.
2. Link stress event to macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, interest rates and the
exchange rate.
3. Use the outcome of the second stage in a satellite model to find eﬀects on variables
measuring banks’ asset quality (typically housing prices).
4. Measure the impact on banks’ balance sheet of the changes in asset quality and
potential credit losses.
When the stress-test is done, one compares the estimated incurred losses with the capital
and liquidity in the banks prior to the shock to see how well the banking sector would
have done in case of an actual shock. A criticism of the macro stress test is that they, in
practice, fail to capture the feedback eﬀects from the financial sector on to the real sector,
if a shock occur. In Foglias setup, this would translate into the eﬀects of stage 4. back
into the variables first calculated in stage 2.
"The Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP-filter)" was introduced by Hodrick and Prescott
in 1997 and computes the permanent trend, TRt in a time-series xt (Carlo A. Favero 2002).
That is, the HP-filter is derived by minimizing the following expression with respect to
TRt;
TX
t=1
(xt   TRt)2 +  
T 1X
t=2
[(TRt+1   TRt)2   (TRt   TRt 1)2]
The value of   is optional. A higher value gives a smoother trend, as deviations in trend
from the previous value is penalized harder.
In 2010, the Basel Committee for Banking supervision recommended a new regulatory
framework regarding capital and liquidity in the banking sector (Norges Bank No.1 2013).
EU followed up a year later, and the "Countercyclical capital buﬀer" will also apply
for Norway due to the EEA agreement. The new regulation consists of stricter capital
requirements on banks, in terms of both quality and quantity.
The framework looks like the following;
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• Banks must at all times satisfy a requirement of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1),
which will amount to 4.5 percentage point of the banks’ risk weighted assets (RWA).
• On top of this, there is the buﬀer requirements. This comprises of the permanent
conservation buﬀer of 2.5 percent of the RWA, and the time-varying component
of the buﬀer. This time-varying countercyclical capital buﬀer comes on top of the
permanent, and will be in the range of 0 to 2.5 percent of the RWA of the banks.
The capital ratios are calculated based on the following equation.
CET1 ratio =
CET1 capital
RWA
RWA; Risk Weighted Assets
For a financial institution, their "leverage ratio" consists of the fraction of their as-
sets to equity. In essence, it is an indicator of the extent to which the institution is
financing their assets with debt.
Leverage ratio =
Assets
Equity
There are also other indicators used for measuring the degree of leverage. One example
is debt-to-equity.
"Maturity mismatch" describes the situation where assets are illiquid and their ma-
turity are long term, while financing are short term. For a bank this implies that it is
financed by, besides deposits and equity, short term debt that constantly needs to be
refinanced. In a state of financial instability where insecurity and panic erupts, it may
be diﬃcult for banks to get this short term debt rolled over. So to pay of outstanding
and matured short term debt they might have to liquidate their long term assets. If the
maturity mismatch is a widespread problem, widespread liquidation of long term assets
may turn into a situation of Fire sale.
There is a broad consensus that a dramatic weakening of "underwriting standards"
for mortgages in the US was one of the main causes for the recent crisis. Underwriting
is the summarization of risk ex ante, and is evaluated when assessing a loan application
(Bhardwaj & Sengupta 2009). Hence, the underwriting standard is the threshold of risk
creditors are willing to make.
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A "Fire-sale" is a forced sale at a dislocated price. It is forced in the sense that the
seller can not wait to raise funds, typically because he needs to pay debt. The price is
dislocated because the potential buyers are in the same position as the seller, namely
sellers of the same type of assets. The assets are then sold to alternative buyers who are
only willing to buy at a far lower value than its correct price (Shleifer & Vishny 2010).
The fall in asset prices and hence in collateral values induces a "Forced deleveraging"
process. The ratio of loan to value spikes, so asset owners must sell assets to manage their
debt.
"Debt deflation" describes a situation where the real value of debt is increasing. Debt
is nominal and hence its nominal value do not decrease when asset prices fall. Following
a bust, with widespread fall in asset prices, paying oﬀ debt is diﬃcult since liquidating
collateral might not be enough to cover the nominal debt.
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